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Chapter 1: Introduction
Abstract
With the growing rates of involuntary (forced) migration and even traditional migration
(movement from one country to another in search of work opportunities, better lifestyle, study,
etc.); the movement of these bodies raises their vulnerability to be constructed as threats. The
same threat they are fleeing from, is being attached to them as they attempt to seek security
elsewhere. This intersection of migration and securitization studies especially emerged because
of the interconnectedness of the world that is majorly facilitated by globalization.
Within this context, this thesis examines how Syrian refugees in Lebanon are racialized
because of a securitization process perpetuated by speech acts. It also looks at race and racism in
relation to colonialism as the root cause for the construction of such notions. Within the
Lebanese context, this thesis also looks at nationalism and religion from the Lebanese
perspective in an attempt to explain the racist securitizing attitude towards those refugees.

Keywords: Colonialism; Racism; Nationalism; Securitization; Speech Acts; Syrian
Refugees; Lebanon
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I.

Background Information:
This thesis narrates the history of the earliest forms of racism being explicit biological

racism. It then explains the evolution of explicit racism and how it became more implicit
involving more complex variables to construct racial hierarchies than mere biology. Racism,
according to George Fredrickson (2002), is “when differences that might otherwise be thought of
as ethnocultural are considered innate, indelible, and unchangeable.” Racism has two
components, the first of which is difference and the other is power. It originally came to be from
a mindset of a differentiation between ‘them’ and ‘us’ in permanently unbridgeable ways (Scott,
2007, 45). The main idea of racism is that the racializing party and the racialized can never
coexist in the same space except when the racialized are subordinated by the racializers.
Although processes of racialization are always embedded in other forms of hierarchy, they
acquire autonomy and have independent social effects (Bonilla-Silva 2001, 37).
Colonialism facilitated the spread of racial hierarchies among the different colonies.
These notions were constructed by colonizing superior powers to differentiate themselves from
those colonized, who were seen as subordinate. With explicit racism, the inferior was considered
inhuman, barbaric, and were bound to be exploited because they did not have the same features
as the civilized colonizers. Scientists desperately tried to justify this explicit racism with science.
Back then, the colonizing powers were civilized because they are white. As societies grew more
complex, scientific racism could not make do because of the discovery of many sub-ethnicities
within the same race. At this point, the superior powers had to rely on more abstract variables to
keep the social hierarchies viable. They relied on the difference in culture to instigate biological
racism. Racialization then became about the white being so because they are civilized and not the
other way around. In this case, the uncivilized were everything else but white. Implicit racism,

5

evident in the case study chapter also uses another abstract construct which is nationalism.
Nationalism allows elitists to set borders around those who are ‘similar’ and belonging to a
nation in order to keep those who do not belong outside. Decolonization may have discredited
overt racism and racist regimes, but it is wrong to believe that racism is either dead or dying
(Fredrickson, 2002, 141). While formal colonization may have been abolished, informal
colonization continues. This thesis uses the case of Lebanon as an example to apply the works of
implicit racism on a vulnerable group of people forced to reside in Lebanon, Syrian refugees.
Following a chronological order of historical events, I start at the 15th century where the earliest
1

accounts of racism were found, following its traces past colonization into modernity.
Modernity framed racism, exclusion, conflict, etc. against the calls for universality, but

imperialism structured the notions of citizenship, sovereignty and exclusion. As a result, the
modern discourse of racial hierarchies came to be because of the clash between colonial
domination and freedom. People’s capability to have freedom or progress was decided upon
based on their biological traits. Because of this, colonialism was justified as a natural
subordination of some races for being inferior to others. Colonization hence facilitated the rise of
racial discourses.
In colonies, heterogeneity was controlled by racializing people and classifying them into
sub-categories. Controlling the natives was made possible by combining colonialism and racial
differences to establish stereotypes about the natives and encourage their subordination. Traces
of these stereotypes survive in the post-colonization time. They allow modern racism to explain
the legal and illegal statuses that exist within the same nation.

Geraldine Heng (2020) traces racism to the 1200s as part of the English church’s attempt to label Jews
by making them wear badges to set them apart from the rest of the population
1
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European colonialism consolidated the subordination of other races because in essence,
colonialism is all about differences and race, which was considered the most prominent indicator
of difference. Keeping those two concepts tied together works towards legitimizing colonization.
Europe’s colonial expansion also consolidated history. Eurocentric progressiveness
became the one model of livelihood through time and space. As time passes by, and space
becomes less significant, those labeled as the distant other would become replicas of Europeans.
In a nutshell, Europe now represents what the rest of the world should be like in the future.
Those outside this constructed history, non-nations, do not get granted any rights or freedom,
making it justifiable to destroy them by nations that aim to bring about civilization to them. The
modern terminology that explains recurring historical events is like Social Darwinism: certain
racial attributes can prevent people from evolving towards civilization. This notion of
civilization and social evolution coupled with history work together to present colonialism as
something legitimate. In the name of the civilizing mission Europe assigned itself, there came a
hierarchy of advanced and backward civilizations, hence advanced and backward races. Lebanon
is one of the colonies that fell victim to the vicious cycle of racialization and colonization where
both concepts still influence policy-making in the country and structure its society within.
Long after decolonization, Lebanon, a former French colony, is still to free itself from the
colonial ties France has over it which cause the embedding of racist policy into the Lebanese
government’s attitude towards the Syrian refugees.

II.

Methodology and Case Selection:
The topic of investigation is how securitization produces racism, while looking at how

Syrian refugees, in particular, go through a racialization process in Lebanon that makes it easier
to frame them as a threat through a process of securitization and ignite racial discrimination
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against them. Lebanon is an optimum case study for many reasons. While it is true that Syrian
refugees face racism everywhere they go, mainly Europe, yet them being racialized in Lebanon
is an interesting phenomenon since Syrians and Lebanese are essentially of the same race. This
gives basis to a different kind of analysis for their securitization and then racialization. The
French established themselves as trustees over the Christians of Syria and Lebanon to oppose the
Ottoman’s Muslim rule over the region. As European powers failed to categorize people in this
area based on race the way they did in other parts of the global south, they had to resort to
adopting a sectarian categorization method instead of a racial one (Delatolla and Yao, 2018, 11).
Based on this, the attitude towards Syrian refugees and framing them as threats stems from the
fear of an imbalance of power with the flood of Muslim refugees. Religion adds dimension to
this analysis in order to understand the racialization process of Syrian refugees. Through speech
acts, influential actors in Lebanon frame refugees as a threat to Lebanon’s peace and security and
this ignites a racialization process that ends with discriminatory policies and acts against them.

The tweet above is one example of speech acts that add the notion of nationalism to
religion to legitimize those speech acts. It translates to: “Lebanon is not a homeland of
trusteeships, nor is it a homeland of displacement, or refugeehood. Lebanon is for the Lebanese
and this is not racism but nationalism and Lebanism.”
To make this relation, this thesis builds on qualitative secondary research to narrate the
history of racism starting with the 15th century. It follows a chronology of events that embedded
racism in modern Lebanese policies. This process is necessary for the thesis to establish a
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relationship between colonialism and the construction of Lebanese identity that allows for the
racialization of Syrian refugees, hence the racial discrimination they experience. Primary sources
used for this research come from social media, mainly Twitter, to establish a connection between
empirics and theory. Looking at the official Twitter accounts of different Lebanese leaders
Process tracing is also used to provide a socio-political analysis of a modern phenomenon
that developed through centuries of subjugation, discrimination and racial hierarchy formation.
This method also makes it possible to follow the thread of how colonialism expedited the spread
of racism to the various colonies and how Lebanon in particular was affected by it and still
exhibits forms of colonial subjugation long after independence.

IV.

Focal Point of Thesis:
The Syrian crisis is one that has caused issues of migration and refugees. While this may

seem like a policy issue, it has much to do with issues of race and racialization. The process of
racialization affects millions of refugees and constructs them as a threat to international and
domestic peace and security. There are opportunities for populations to cross borders for
different reasons like seeking a better lifestyle, studying, or working etc. While these individuals
who leave their home country for these reasons face issues of racism, the process of racializing
the refugee is different.
Since refugees are forced to leave their countries because of wars mainly, the threat that
they fled from continues to be attached to them through a securitization process, thus making
them a ‘threat’ to the state they flee to. These refugees are securitized, then racialized. This
allows for tighter controls to be imposed over them wherever they go to keep them out. The
consequences of racializing refugees not only lead to problems of assimilation and integration,
but also perpetuates a narrative of political trauma.
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V. Value of this thesis:
The refugee crisis triggered by the war in Syria that began in 2011 definitely launched a
new wave of racism in different ways. From closing borders to those fleeing the war,
imprisoning others, leaving many in camps under inhumane conditions, to the calling of how
much of a danger they pose and the need to return them back to their war-torn country. All of
which are acts with underlying racism. Because of this, it is vital to keep the discussion going in
the hopes that policies are encouraged to change and that states would move towards
universality.

VI. Structure of this thesis:
The purpose of the second chapter is to briefly furnish the original concept of racism
being ‘explicit’ racism when biological determinants were at the core of the racial categorization
of people. This, of course, is not to say that the explicit biology-based racism does not exist
anymore. It is practically masked by a more abstract form which is the implicit one. For
example, with many immigrants moving from former colonies to either England or France
normalized the use of the term ‘culture’ as a means to differentiate the unwelcome guests from
those who are “pure” British or French instead of using the color to make this differentiation
(Fredrickson, 2002, 141). Another concept used in the differentiation is ‘nationalism’, yet
another construct just like ‘race’. Building on this, chapter two also discusses the process of
racialization caused by social Darwinism and the creation of the ‘stranger danger’ notion to
facilitate the securitization of the ‘stranger’. This argument is relevant because securitization is
essentially used as a tool to construct Syrian refugees as threats to not only Lebanon’s security
but also their national identity. This chapter also introduces speech act theory that explains the
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main claim of this thesis which is that refugees are securitized then racialized using speech acts
that cause acts of discrimination and racism against them. Speech act theory is a theory that
explains the use of words to cause actions and not just convey information. Speech acts also
reinforce the concept of implicit racism since speeches of politicians are carefully written in a
way that they are racist and insinuate racist feelings and action without using clear terminology
of racism.
Chapter three contributes to the discussion by tracing the origins of Lebanese nationalism
and pointing it out as a clear construct and those that did perpetuate its creation were motivated
by personal goals and agendas contrary to the popular argument of wanting to defy Arabism and
challenge the Ottomans’ rule. This chapter also explains how nationalism is also an ingredient to
the ‘us’ versus ‘them’ paradigm that essentially makes it easier to frame ‘them’ as ‘threats’ and
that ‘us’ need protection. While refugees are entitled to specific humanitarian rights, they are
commonly stripped because of the mislabeling of status. This is especially evident in the
penultimate chapter. Refugees are protected by the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967
Protocol and other legal conventions or agreements like the 1969 OAU Refugee Convention2.
Public calls to deny them refugeehood is evident in speech acts by political and public figures as
seen in chapter four. The final section of this chapter explains how France managed to
orchestrate the installation of a unique system of power to ensure the division within Lebanon
lasts long after independence.
Chapter four includes a section outlining the Palestinian refugees’ struggle in Lebanon
and how this was also used to inform the public of the mistake that was previously made to allow
them to stay in Lebanon. One not to be repeated again with the Syrian refugees. To understand

2

https://www.unhcr.org/news/latest/2016/7/55df0e556/unhcr-viewpoint-refugee-migrant-right.html
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the magnitude of the issue, a brief timeline of the refugees’ flow to Lebanon is included along
with the different layers of response at different stages of their arrival. The chapter uses empirics
such as tweets, images, and slogans that contain vivid examples of speech acts used against
Syrian refugees in Lebanon by both public figures and citizens
This thesis concludes, in chapter five, that it is evident that Syrian refugees securitized
through speech acts that stir the public’s opinion and causes the refugees to be racialized and
discriminated against.
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Chapter 2: Race, Racialization and
Securitization

This chapter will discuss race as the fundamental aspect to the process of categorization
of people. Contemporary dynamics of racism can be said to have begun in modernity with
colonialism and still has ongoing consequences. Recent events in the Middle East and
particularly in Lebanon force us to take another look at the political dynamics of the country.
Discussing colonialism is important because a western account of non-Europeans allows
for an understanding of racial ideology. The modern construction of race during post-coloniality
is rooted in colonialism. Conquests and exploitation are as old as the earliest records of historical
accounts of racism that we have. This is important for this thesis because it discusses the case of
Lebanon, a former French colony, and its relations with Syrian refugees who are citizens of
another former French colony, while both essentially belonging to the same piece of land where
no such differentiation was made before and rather introduced by colonization.
Ussama Makdisi (2000) explains that Lebanon exhibits a case of sectarianism that was a
result of competition between the Ottomans, Europeans and Lebanese on modernization
narratives (Makdissi, 2000, 6). Racialization was key in producing sectarianism and essential for
its reproduction. The process of producing sectarianism had to involve an imaginary competition
between ‘races’ along with the Orientalist notion that such a competition is and always will be
relevant to date (Makdissi, 2000, 184). The different categories or hierarchies produced are
essentially constructed by elites (those who have power and monopoly over resources) as they
create the model of stratification based on racial aspects.
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The construction of ‘race’ and the creation of biology-based determinants of society:
Race and racism refer to a categorization that uses biological attributes as well as
behavioral ones to construct a power dynamic. This power dynamic causes a structural social
system that imposes social and political hierarchies among people where the more powerful
groups are dominant over those less powerful.
According to Mills, (1997), race is rather a modern construct that came to be with the as a
product of colonial rule (Golash-Boza, 2016, 130), making racism along with slavery, conquest
and colonialism, almost always associated with the early and later stages of building the nation
and the move forward to national consolidation. The most popular understanding of ‘race’ is that
it exists as a way to be identified based on physical (biological) traits. Whiteness, for one, is not
just a race but ‘the race’. European whiteness is a starting point of analysis because every racial
category seems to be defined based on what whiteness is or is not. This racism lives on the
construction of symbolic boundaries between these racial categories as its binary system of
‘white’ and ‘non-white’ constantly attempts to normalize the difference to create a belongingness
and otherness (Hall, 1988, 28). In a western context, ‘race’ is an issue of black versus white. Yet
proponents of critical race theory examined the issue beyond the boundaries of the west. Etienne
Balibar (1988), for one, claims that there is no unified type of racism but rather many varieties of
it (Balibar, 1988, 38-40). In the Lebanese context, sectarianism makes it possible to see how
social categories and asymmetrical power dynamics and structures work together to produce
racism.
Classification of bodies in Europe began as early as the 17th century since science
dominated and so it compelled people to categorize each other based on biological attributes
(mostly color) to determine who is an ally and who is an enemy. Then the 19th century unfolded

14

with European colonialism and its furnishing of capitalist approaches. Both instigated racial
discourses to rationalize the contact between the westerners and non-westerners. European
dominance was also legitimated as having a God-given mandate to rule as European colonizers
were to appear God-like among the natives (Vincent, 1982, 664). In other words, modern racial
identities became popular due to European economic and geographic expansion in the 19th
century that brought the whites to the non-whites. The relationship between them was
constructed on the premises of denying or suppressing the subjectivity of the non-Europeans
(Krishna, 2001, 410).

Social Darwinism and Stranger Danger:
The following sections explores how and why racism had to take a new form to include
not only biological traits but also cultural ones. This change explains modern racism and racist
attitudes between people in regions where racism was introduced through colonization.
Because of the desire to establish social order and hierarchies, racialization was born due
to the infusion of biology and culture. As a result, racialized groups are singled out for having
distinct cultural identities for them to be defined as ‘alien’ which will make them endure
discrimination and prejudice (Modood, 2005, 38). This exclusion, as Weber calls it ‘social
closure’, involves maximizing rewards by restricting access to any resources or opportunities to a
group of chosen people or ‘eligibles’ (Lewis, 2003, 285). The notion of social enclosure fueled
the ‘stranger danger’ discourse which is supposed to remind us that the danger comes from what
is outside the community we live in as in it is coming from outsiders (Ahmed, 2007,162). The
essence of rationalization of minority groups is to keep emphasizing the differences among
people (Suzuki, 2017, 289). But not all the strangers who get to the borders, like tourists or
immigrants, are seen as strangers. Some of them are seen so because of their origin as in having
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the right passport to cross a border does not guarantee that someone will be accepted if they have
the wrong name or body (Ahmed, 2007, 162). Race also intersects with class which makes
Marxists worry that race is a mask to class inequality which sustains exploitation and capitalism.
(Buzaz, 2013, 578). Critical race theory gives the most accurate of the racial reality than any
other paradigm as it does not see racism as something decreasing. It was important for the
colonizers to establish racial categorization as a political ideology to justify enslavement,
genocide and exclusion in the name of white supremacy (Christian et al., 2019, 4). This is why
phenotypic racism is considered a foundation for more complicated racism.
Race should be recognized as an unstable notion that constantly reproduces and
reconstructs class, gender and other social fabrics (Tabil, 2013, 126). To be able to understand
the production and reproduction of racial ideology and structure, one must look at how they are
produced on a day-to-day basis (Lewis, 2003, 284).
During the 1980s, with the rise of new ethnicities, a new form of racism emerged as
several sociologists and antiracism activists rejected the idea of biological racism especially after
the Holocaust. This type of racism is said to have emerged for the first time in Enoch Powell’s
speeches in the late 1960 but gained popularity in the 1980s (Modood, 2005, 27). The absence of
specific desired cultural traits or values or beliefs allowed for the racialization process to
continue with this new criterion to make one ‘culture’ more dominant than the other (Jones,
1999, 466). This new understanding came to be known as Social Darwinism. Charles Darwin’s
theory of evolution succeeded because it was something that reflected tangible evidence that
people can see for themselves. Even though Darwin focused on the biological evolution of
species, Herbert Spencer, who coined the term ‘survival of the fittest’ saw that the same principle
can be applied to human societies because they too operate within the same framework of natural
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selection as they move from primitive societies to more complex ones (Dennis, 1995, 245).
Social Darwinism came to enshrine the idea of European culture’s superiority. This is not to say
that biological racism does not exist anymore but it just means that it has taken a new disguise to
fit the current events. Racism that relied on biology was developed within the legacy of
colonialism and modern slavery. It relied on an insufficient ideology based on a pseudo-science
and pseudo-scientific theories of racism to explain and justify inequality, exploitation, and
establish hierarchies to create a universal order. The other’s identity in this kind of racism poses
as a warrant to its annihilation because it is considered impure, or insufficient.
Biology-based racism may be sidelined for some time but it will emerge to support
cultural racism. In a nutshell, cultural prejudices could eventually trigger color-based racism
(Modood, 2005, 37). There is almost no effort in problematizing racism in its different types and
putting it into question with regards to ethics or morals (Giroux, 1993, 99).

Racialization:
Racial formation theory explores the social construction of race as something ongoing
that varied across time, producing racialization. With no inequality, racial ideologies and racebased domination would have no power, as it would have nothing to justify or challenge (Doane,
2017, 977). Even when the hierarchy among cultures was still then based on biological traits to
distinguish three color categories, those categories were also given labels regarding their culture
and capabilities: the negro, being the lowest, the yellow race being mediocre at everything, and
finally the white race being the superior race (Vincent, 1982, 660). This makes it certain that for
one, race is grounded in history and two, it is formed by experiences of the body. Frantz Fanon’s
work tells us that bodies are essentially shaped by colonial histories that make the world we
‘inherited’ white. It makes the world ready to be inhabited by chosen bodies that fit. Race then
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becomes something social and bodily given, so what we receive from others are the objects that
are put within our reach as inheritance of the history mentioned (Ahmed 2007, 153-4). Going
back to the root cause of this phenomenon, theorists traced racism and found it in capitalism and
colonialism.
When white Europeans discovered people, who appeared different from themselves, they
described the new people by comparing them to themselves. The obvious trait was color which
was ‘not white’ and that made whiteness the starting point of describing the ‘other. To unravel
whiteness, it can be understood as an orientation. It is a ‘starting point’ that involves the notion
of how to ‘proceed’ from this alleged starting point. This leads to the notion of race as
phenomenology that makes us aware of what is around us (Ahmed, 2007, 151). This is important
because different relationships and results are produced based on these interactions. In this
respect, what our bodies come in contact with are shaped by what we do to them and our bodies
are also shaped by what we get in contact with. This makes orientation a form of directions that
put some things in our reach and not others (Ahmed, 152, 2007). When we come in contact with
the ‘other’, there is a form of uncertainty and suspicion. There is no standard manual on how to
treat this other, so Stephen Walt, a realist, says that ideology shapes perception when there is a
form of uncertainty towards the intentions of the other. Europeans are certain about themselves,
they are white. But the ‘other’ that they encountered is not and so what Europeans made of the
different people they encountered was based on who they are and what they are like in
comparison to the other. This makes whiteness itself a form of orientation, or a definitive staring
point of figuring out how to describe and interact with the people who are non-white. In Sarah
Ahmed’s Phenomenology of whiteness, she quotes Frantz Fanon’s example to illustrate how
whiteness is an orientation. Fanon’s account is as follows: “I know that if I want to smoke, I shall
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have to reach out my right arm and take the pack of cigarettes lying at the other end of the table.
The matches, however, are in the drawer on the left, and I shall have to lean back slightly. And
all these movements are made not out of habit but out of implicit knowledge” (Fanon, 1986, 110111). Fanon described how his body wanted to do an action to get an object. This action is
fundamentally an orientation towards the future that exhibits an intention. Since the body is
familiar with this object, it is familiar with the action needed to obtain it, not because that action
is a mere habit. Even if the cigarettes and matches are there, he did not happen to just be at a
reaching point. Instead, Fanon suggests that being part of what he called the corporeal schema is
not enough. He suggests thinking of the historical racial schema beneath it. The historical and
racial dimensions are beneath the body’s surface which becomes its own orientation (Ahmed,
2007, 153). Fanon’s example demonstrates what the body is like before it is racialized, as in
assigned a race to. According to him, race does not interrupt the corporeal schema but mainly
forms a structure to the way it operates.
It is a fact that racialization grew with colonization and European state-making
expeditions. This role of creating states in colonies institutionalized racialization as it became
more like a tool of power that became infused with the making of the state and together
constituted modern rule. The Political power and economic structure of the now decolonized and
the neo-colonized states, came to be through colonization. Even if the modern understanding of
racialization claims that this notion is unlawful, colonialism definitely spread racial differences
that became deeply embedded in modern states as they think they gained sovereign rule and
nationhood.
Foucault’s account of racism was based on biology as a basis for power relations, while
W.E.B Du Bois gives more emphasis on the essential social features of racism because according
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to him, biology is a ‘badge’ of race and does not account for the social interactions. As Omi and
Winant argue, racialization then is used to frame the process of formation and change which did
not just happen to bodies but also to social relations, institutions and state actions (Lewis et al.,
2019, 33). Institutions are also considered as orientation devices because they take the shape and
form of whatever is inside them. For example, white bodies gather to create an institution so it is
considered white as well because it is formed by whites. Even if non-whites inhabit a white
institution, they have to adopt the whiteness if they are willing to stay in this white institution
(Ahmed, 2007, 157-8). Racialization hence, involves assigning bodies to racial categories and
associating symbols, attributes, qualities and other meanings to the categories. Racial identities
are constructed in three steps: first, there has to be a racial label pertaining to the racial identity
of the group. Second, they have to have specific norms and roles assigned to them and there
would be definitive expectations related to their racial identity. Third, the members of the group
accept the racial identity assigned to them. The result of this is that this group acquires a race as a
new status. This racial categorization, in turn, decides who is similar or not and who gets a
certain opportunity and who does not. More even when it comes to resources, it decides on who
gets what. As a consequence of this process, those who are excluded do not only lose material
privileges, they are also denied participation in institutions and representative entities because of
the categorization (Lewis, 2003, 287). As administrative states formed from the 16th century to
the 19th century, governments concentrated on controlling the big masses on their territories
rather than the territories themselves. So according to Foucault, modern powers began since then
to interfere with the human body as a biological species and called this the power of biopower
(Howell and Richter Montpetit, 2019, 4). The people who are prevented from moving across
spaces are forced to move in a different way. If racist habits which resulted from racist actions
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are inherited like race, then people can also inherit the things that do not become habits as well.
For example, inheriting a Muslim name. The body is recognized as “could be Muslim” meaning
that it could also be a terrorist. Spaces that bodies can move across do not extend the surface of
our bodies and so not being white is not extended by the space we inhabit (Ahmed, 2007, 162163).
In light of this, superior states can exercise biopower which is a word that combines both
race as a powerful tool and race as a historical process. In addition to this, there came the
construct of a ‘threat’, for example, the ‘Yellow Peril’ consisting of the Chinese and the
Japanese. Along with white superiority came the fear that the superior civilization was threatened
by the inferior ones (Vincent, 1982, 661). This leads to no surprises with regards to the racial
categorization goal European colonialism had. The reason why white superiority continued was
the fear that the poorer races were going to overpower the richer race and ruin the latter’s
advancements. The tight immigration laws in rich countries are said to be this way because of
this ancient fear (Vincent, 1982, 667), and because of the racist attitudes that manifest in
exclusions or partial rights if any.
According to Fenton (2003), since race is seen as something hereditary, it makes people
of the same race have a familial relationship with each other because they have shared
characteristics forming the ‘us’ and ‘them’ dichotomy. This makes biopower see the enemies
(those who are unlike us) as threats to the health and wellbeing of the people and being the
‘death’ of the other. Those who are seen as unfit or dangerous have to die so that life would be
more healthy and ‘pure’ (Howell and Richter Montpetit, 2019, 5).
Moreover, because race became an idea that was tied to the notions of European
superiority or white supremacy, both became concrete ideologies with European colonization.
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Philosopher Charles Mills (1997), links ideology and structure as he goes to explain that white
supremacy is a unique power that involves both formal and informal rule, socioeconomic
privilege and enforces norms that dictate the distribution of wealth and opportunities, etc.
(Golash-Boza, 2016, 130-133). Consequently, two major problems arose from white colonialists
being in contact with non-whites. The first was the extension of white man’s rule in countries
inhabited by the non-whites and the second was discrimination against people of color who enter
or want to enter non-white people’s countries (Vitalis and Shulman, 2010,58), as mentioned
earlier. An essential pillar in the logic of white supremacy is slavery which made Black people
slave-able by nature since they are considered no better than property (Smith, 2012, 68).
Charles Herriam (1924) claimed that what is shaping contemporary politics, for one, was
further development of industrialism and the penetration of the ‘backward states’ in the world,
or, what he refers to as, the invasion of the tropical zone by the temperate one. For another, it
was the rise in race problems and how nationalism was at the core of race expression (Vitalis and
Shulman, 2010, 59). In addition to this crucial revelation, the work of Rogers Brubaker in 1998
on citizenship and nationhood sparked the narrative that race and racism are essential to the
making of a nation (Suzuki, 2017, 288).
Religion also takes a national form in certain conditions within a historical frame as it
plays a vital role in the construction of a nationalist movement but it must be paired with national
interests. The logic of inside and outside works by actions of splitting looking over the
commonalities between the ‘self and the ‘other’ (Blaney and Inayatulla, 2000, 33). If nationalists
favor those who belong to their nation and keep ‘others’ at their borders, then this would make
them racists by definition. Even if nationalists do this in the name of protecting culture. It is
made and reproduced. Histories of nationalism exemplify that it was not achieved or constructed
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without racism or racist intentions. In addition, cultural racism in particular will prove to be
particularly harder on minorities who wish to maintain basic elements, at the very least, of their
own culture or religion beyond their skin color (Modood, 2005, 39). Since new cultural
boundaries were bound to emerge and crossroads with the diversity of the other, the codes that
refer to the relationship between the cultural borders have to be rearranged to engage with the
cultural differences and the new networks of hierarchy and power struggle (Giroux, 1993, 100).
This was the dilemma of the colonized people who were pushed to assimilate and adopt the
culture of their colonizers and their language, for the purpose of this thesis, Lebanon poses as a
very interesting case that did not follow this rule of thumb. This country demonstrates how class
and religious dynamics lead to the construction of an identity with the help of the colonizer,
namely, France.
This constructed national identity is deeply embedded in Lebanese history that it is taking
a modern form of racism against a particular ‘unwanted’ group, Syrian refugees. What makes
this problem worse and gives it a racist form is that Lebanon not only sees itself as superior to
other Arab nations, but also acts as if it is ‘white’ and believes in that.

Securitization Theory:
With the growing numbers of civil wars, and conflicts of a geo-political nature, the
crossing of borders became an issue of security rather than one of immigration to seek a better
life. The movement of bodies from war zones to stable zones has become one particular issue
related to peace and security. The securitization process of such people is done by governmental
officials, influential elites (those possessing wealth, and can influence a large audience), and of
course the media of the receiving state.
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A securitization process has a level of subjectivity. Framing something or someone as a
threat has no manual to follow. From a poststructuralist perspective, language plays a crucial role
in making sense of the world especially that it is essential for politicians to use to garner public
support (Hansen in Baylis et.al, 2011, 172). Securitization theory lies at the core of structuring
the identity of ‘threat’ and attaching it to individuals through speech acts. It starts by one group
of elites or state leaders with a large base of supporters convincing their constituents that they
need protection. When the threat is constructed, normal politics do not apply anymore and thus
extreme measures are justified because the population needs to be protected. The rhetoric in this
process involves using stereotypes and images to garner support for the abnormal politics being
practiced. The use of images and specific features or traits to securitize individuals is the core of
racism.
Following the Cold War, questions of security arose and due to those, securitization
theory stemmed in the 1980s with Ole Waever, Barry Buzan, and de Wilde being the pioneers of
the Copenhagen School of security studies, which gave birth to Securitization Theory. These
authors created another dimension of security study which previously, dominated by the realist
approach, solely focused on threats that come from military power. They included the security of
the society as well as the security of the nation. This made the referent object of security is
society rather than the state.
According to Waever, when it comes to defending social identities, the Copenhagen
School illustrates that threatened societies respond in one obvious way and that is to strengthen
their social identity to combat the foreign one. They do this using cultural ways to reinforce their
social cohesion and ensure to reproduce their social identity in an effective way (Roe, 2012,
280). Since the Copenhagen school uses the term ‘audience’, it could be considered as having a
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post-structuralist perspective of securitization since the receiver (public) is what matters in this
process.
The process of securitization has three key components. Waever, Buzan, and de Wilde
identify them in their theory of securitization: referent objects, those that are in the face of an
existential threat; securitizing actors, those who say that the referent object is facing an
existential threat; and functional actors, those with the power to make an influence (Buzan et
al.,1998, 36). The securitizing actor constructs the threat by using speech acts to compel their
audience. Securitizing actors describe threats to the identity of the group that is threatened using
words like: die, perish, wither, waste, decline, etc. (Roe, 280, 2012).
Yet for the words to be convincing, there needs to be facilitating conditions to make
securitization work. This makes the form of the speech act, and the position of the securitizing
actor and the history that is associated with the threat, essential for the success of the
securitization process (McDonald, 2008, 571). These actors use this rhetoric to design laws and
emergency ad hoc rules using words like: to halt, contain, control or avoid a danger, even though
these measures taken may go against the constitution or even disregard international human
rights norms or even go against what is common sense (Trevino-Rangel, 2016, 292). The speech
act or the securitizing action do not automatically result in securitization. The act results in such
if the audience accepts the securitizing speech (Buzan et al.,1998, 25-31). The crucial role the
audience plays is evident in the securitization process since they are greatly responsible for the
success of the speech act. There is no specific audience that is targeted but rather several
audiences depending on the nature of the threat. The audience is meant to serve two purposes.
The first of which is to provide the securitizing actor with the mandate that is usually not within
the scope of ‘normal politics.’ The second is merely giving the securitizing actor moral support.
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If they do not accept the securitizing speech, the securitizing actor will have failed in
legitimizing the use of extreme measures to deal with the threat that is socially constructed. The
word security then is not just a simple word but one with a performance to make. It has the
power to transform the social reality we live in (Balzacq et. al, 495-500).
A question arises about why some particular representations of threats work with one
audience and not with another? What makes one securitizing actor so powerful and another so
marginalized? (McDonald, 2008, 564). Who exactly is benefiting from such a process? A great
criticism of this notion is that it relies heavily on linguistics to deliver its threatening messages as
opposed to relying on political processes instead. All the issues are part of a plot across three
categories which are, non-politicized, politicized and securitized. The first is not considered
important and does not need a public debate or public comments and therefore no urgent action
needs to be taken. As this issue becomes politicized, it is then debated and is part of public policy
such as education and this entails different allocation of resources. If the issue is securitized, it is
then an existential threat that requires extreme measures to solve it.
Waever and Barry Buzan found that analyzing the apparent objective threat is not
enough. For them, analyzing the process where the press or the executive give the public the
news of a threat before elaborating on the counter measures that would be taken is what really
matters. The result of this may be an increase in the number of police officers, more armaments,
etc. (Trevino-Rangel, 2016, 292). Securitization is a call for a response kind of process, where
the securitizing actor calls for an action to respond to a matter of security. What matters next is
that the audience must accept and believe that they are threatened. The argument has to be
framed in a convincing way to achieve the desired support that would justify any extreme
measures (Roe, 2012, 281). A securitizing discourse can only be complete if there is an
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existential threat that calls for an emergency type of action. The desired result is for a response to
take place free of any rules (Watson, 2011, 6). Based on this definition, the ‘threat’ does not have
to be objective or materialistic. This is potentially problematic since literally anything or anyone
could be labeled a threat (Robinson, 2017, 506).
According to Grayson, threats should be termed as vulnerabilities because threats are
seen as present dangers that require urgent action but vulnerabilities are deemed as future risks
that do not have the same sense of urgency or carry specific policy to be made (Roe, 2012, 283).
This can be useful in the process of securitization to justify the measures to be taken against
those vulnerabilities. Securitization theory was developed as an attempt to break down the
process of securitization and look into how and why it happens and to whom or what. To
understand securitization, scholars tend to use discourse analysis since securitization is not one
individual act but rather a dynamic process and it is usually traced within case studies (Robinson,
2017, 506). Securitized problems can be either managed or transformed. By management, it is
not meant that these issues are put back within the framework of normal politics. Managing such
issues may give them a sense of normalization but still, securitization language is present (Roe,
2004, 285).
According to the Copenhagen School, security is a core political act and it is something
that we should be careful with. It is not only about ruling out a threat or articulating fear, but it is
something that could possibly cause abnormal politics or extreme politics to take place. This will
bring unforeseeable consequences on everyone (Williams, 2011, 459). This school speaks of
threats in a way similar to realism’s state of nature concept. Securitization can be a
conceptualization of the traditional realist understanding of national security where the speaker
and the audience negotiate on the measures to be used which are usually far-reaching (Stritzel
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and Chang, 2015, 550). Original securitization studies by Buzan et al. (1998) was based on the
differentiation of several sectors, which are political, economic, military, societal and
environmental.
With constructivism as an approach, securitization is then the ‘positioning’, with the use
of speech acts usually by political leaders, of a specific issue as a threat to the survival of the
people. Balzacq (2011) claims that securitization is just practices that are articulated using
metaphors, policies, images, stereotypes, etc. by the securitizing actor to make his audience
create implications by appealing to their emotions, sensations, thoughts, etc. about an object and
give it a threatening aura so that creating a policy to block it an easy job. With the constituents'
consent, it enables emergency measures to be taken in with suspending ‘normal politics’ to deal
with that same issue (McDonald, 2008, 566). The word positioning is an interesting choice of
word here because it conceptualizes how the construction of the threat is subjective and based on
what the situation demands. The sense of urgency becomes institutionalized, since institutions
are the channels that the actors use, based on the given type of threat whether it was a persistent
one or one that is recurring. As a result of institutionalizing the response, bureaucracies are
created and or the military is mobilized to respond to the threat. The discursive practices political
elites use justify the exceptional measures that violate existing rules. This kind of securitization
is largely successful and because it is, it becomes institutionalized (Watson, 2011, 8).
The construction of a threat could also be called ‘framing’ since it is possible that it is
subjective and even non-existence. Frames are meant to methodologically interpret what is ‘out
there’ to be convincing (Rychnovska, 2014, 15). There obviously remains a choice whether to
categorize these bodies out there as a threat or not and their characterization as one often comes
from a political leader to their constituents to justify the extreme measures they are about to use

28

(McDonald, 566, 2008). This comes especially useful when using securitization to analyze the
issue of migration and determining that it did not bring with it a human rights crisis (TrevinoRangel, 2016, 290). When it comes to migration issues, governments, religious institutions, the
media, academics and experts intervene to convince the public that migration is a threat to
security (Trevino-Rangel, 2016, 292).
The framework of securitization becomes exceptionally relevant when it comes to the
discussion and analysis of immigrants, refugees or asylum seekers. The same language is used to
characterize these people and they are responded to as ‘threats’ through tightening immigration
procedures, borders or even use of military power (McDonald, 2008, 566). Political elites along
with the media and governments construct immigration as a threat to national security, the
stability of the economy and ‘national identity’. Migrants are then divided into two categories;
desirable and undesirable. This categorization depends on their skills, their background,
education, etc. (Jaskulowski, 2018, 711). In light of this, governments then restrict borders and
control admissions of people across them.
One can establish a relationship between securitization and nationalism. If we accept that
the concept of a nation is a construct, then nationalism is too. Both are so ambiguous that they
provide securitizing actors with dense material to work with. It becomes simple for securitizing
actors to associate the nation with matters that their populations care about to force them to
accept the extreme measures they want to carry out to face the constructed ‘threat’.
A problem with securitization according to McDonald, is that the ‘form’ of the
securitizing act is not properly defined and focuses on speech the dominant actors, usually
political leaders, use. According to him, speech acts are not the only tool securitizing actors use
to construct a threat but for this study, it is the main focus. The second problem is the context of
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the securitization act. It is also defined narrowly since it only focuses on the immediate moment
of intervention as opposed to the whole picture. The process of securitization takes time and
happens one step at a time and this should be thoroughly looked into. This is why when I make
the connection between Lebanese nationalism and securitization, I explain the historical timeline
that led to the establishment of the Lebanese identity to give a more elaborate picture. The third
problem is concerning the framework of securitization as in the nature of the act of
securitization. The act is always defined by the existence and in relations to a threat (McDonald,
2008, 564). Yet this third problem does not really pose a weakness in the analysis because this
kind of interpretation and framing of securitization was greatly supported after the 9/11 attacks.
The occurrences of that day serve as a priori for the rest of the states to tighten their border
control and regulations while framing migrants as an imminent threat to their national security
and constituents (Trevino-Ragel, 2016, 292).
Securitization theory of the Copenhagen school is criticized because it characterizes
securitization as a discursive practice and that belittles the role of bureaucracy which allows for
securitization to happen. Securitization, however, is not only about speech acts. It is also enabled
by a variety of institutional security means that professionals undertake to reinforce their position
as protectors of their nation’s security and preservers of its peace. They use this discourse as a
decoy to their own failures so as to manage their constituents’ grievances (Bigo, 2002, 65).
Theorists of the Paris School, stress on the importance of the possibility of institutionalizing
security threats. This school highlights the role of the systems that security professionals use to
give power to their practices more than what the Copenhagen School concentrates on which is
speech acts and extreme politics (Bigo, 2002, 65). Even though the focus on linguistics may be
problematic as it undermines the other aspects of securitization like images and the different uses
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of in in the securitization process (Williams, 2003, 179-196), for example, the role of the
audience according to the Copenhagen School is poorly outlined. It is perhaps because the theory
focuses on speech acts more than the audience (Balzacq, 2005, 171-201).
Even though the Copenhagen School is also criticized for its lack of consideration when
it comes to the context and the role it plays in creating the speech act, a sociological perspective
of securitization, applied by some scholars, gives a more holistic overview. Such a method
allows analysis to incorporate social, cultural, political and historical factors to analyze the
securitization process of refugees. Balzacq argues that the audience along with the context and
political agency play a crucial role and that it is wrong to overlook them as often happens
because they essentially guide the analysis of linguistics that construct threats (Balzacq, 2005,
173). A sociological approach puts securitization into a pragmatic framework as it is seen as a
result of certain circumstances, a specific context, a specific psychographic of the audience and
the power of the audience and the securitizing actor. All of which interact to make securitization
happen (Balzacq, 2011, 1).
This theory in particular is relevant to this research because it explains how the Lebanese
government with the help of the media acts as a securitizing actor to frame Syrian refugees as an
existential threat to the stability of Lebanon’s security through speech acts. These speech acts
convince the audience that the securitizing acts are in their own benefit to save them from the
threat they framed.

Speech Act Theory:
The securitization process of Syrian refugees in Lebanon relies on the socio-historical
context of Lebanon and is facilitated by speech acts. Speech acts along with historical, cultural,
political, economic and geographic elements work together to contribute to the racialization and
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securitization of those refugees. All these contributed to the creation of the element of fear
among the audience (Lebanese population) which in turn allowed governmental and elitist
figures to construct those vulnerable bodies as ‘threats’ to Lebanon’s security, as well as national
and cultural identity of the Lebanese through various media.
Speech act theory is originally a philosophical theory that is concerned with the ways in
which language is used. It is now a theory that is used in many other disciplines, mainly
linguistics. For the purpose of my thesis, I intend to bring it to center stage and use it to explain
how securitization is evident, even if subtly, in racist speech acts that are broadcasted on several
kinds of media platforms against Syrian refugees in Lebanon. Michael Halliday sees that
scholars intend to overlook which is that linguistic theories have social values and that they are
determined by ideology (Pratt, 1986, 59). Halliday is saying that linguistic theories sometimes
produce ideologies because through dialogue, people can gather others’ beliefs and ideologies
and make them up for recognition, use or critique (Pratt, 1986, 59).
A politician’s speech, for example, is concerned with persuading others to make them
believe what they are saying and so Speech Acts play a fundamental role for this reason.
(Dylgjerii, 2017, 19). The Speech Act theory is best described as ‘How Things are Done with
Words Theory’ because it has roots in the works of Austin (1962) and Searle (1969) (Dylgjerii,
2017, 21). John Langshaw Austin (1962) began the engagement with speech acts philosophically
when he corrected his previous understanding of performative utterances. Before, he
underestimated the meanings that the acts a person can perform have and convey while making
them, he argues that words are tools that can be used for different purposes
(Verschueren,1978,69). He originally saw that not all utterances can be accounted for using a
logic that is truth-conditional (Pratt, 1986, 60), he takes utterances out of the ‘true’ and ‘false’
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dichotomy to put them in the category of a ‘performance’, meaning that speech acts that are not
stating facts cannot be interpreted as true or false but are evaluated in a different way . He goes
on to explain that when someone says something, called a locutionary act, he is also doing
something by saying it. This doing is called an illocutionary act. According to him, speech acts
are split into three categories: A locutionary act that means actually saying something as in
uttering words, an illocutionary act which is the core of any theory on speech acts and a
perlocutionary act which is the influence on the feelings, opinions, thinking or actions of the
audience. Illocutionary acts of the speech hold the intentions of the actor in their speech
(Dylgjerii, 2017, 19). A perlocutionary act can encourage, persuade or promise the listeners.
Levinson (1981), says that the perlocutionary act is practically the intended or the intended
results of the speakers’ words (Dylgjerii, 2017, 21).
While Austin left things in an abstract way and focused on the three categories, John
Searle, Austin’s student, tried to bring together the loose ends Austin left. He adds that
everything the actor says has a meaning (Niesen, 2018, 58). Being a bit skeptical of Austin’s
three-category analysis, Searle distinguishes between a proposition’s content and the force or
role it actually plays and that is what is called an illocution instead of between what is said and
the action done. He solely focuses on the illocutionary act. Searle also puts the illocutionary act
in five categories: Assertive (description of the state of affairs), Directive (requesting,
commanding or advising), Commissive (promising, talking of an act that would be done in the
future), Expressive (excuses and sympathy) and Declarative (saying something and making it
happen like declaring a war or saying someone is guilty), (Dylgjerii, 2017, 21-22). A directive
speech act for example is meant to make the listener do something, but a suggestion, however, is
a speech act that has little force. A command, for example, has the strongest force. So for Searle,
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the illocutionary aspect is what is central in his analysis. Yet both Searle and Austin emphasize
the effect speech acts have on people as in the way they have the power to make someone feel
happy or scared by saying the exact same words.
What matters too is the position and profile of the speaker as in if someone is to claim
that they are to christen a ship or give orders to a person to do something, they need to have a
certain social role or else the conditions for success are not fulfilled. This is because Speech acts
always refer to the speaker and the audience along with the inferences and assumptions from the
perspective of those two components (Pratt, 1986, 61). If a speech act achieves its illocutionary
goals it is considered a successful one. As in, the actor is convincing and credible enough for the
listener (audience) to accept what is said, which is something the actor cannot predict or ensure
beforehand (Niesen, 2018, 61). For the same reason, speech acts and the locutions performed
both are dependent on the speaker’s intentions within a given context where he utters the
propositions (Dylgjerii, 2017, 20). The content of the interaction is decided upon based on the
intentions, individuals have and the quality of these interactions are dependent on the qualities
these individuals have. For example, rationality, consistency and so on (Pratt, 1986, 62).
Sometimes, the speaker would make a speech acts as part of some group or as a distinguished
rank in a particular hierarchy or may at other times speak for himself depending on the situation
and intention (Prat, 1986, 63).
In this respect, H. P Grice (1976) claims that in order for a person to utter something and
mean it, they must intend three things at least. The first is that they must be seeking a specific
reaction from their listener. The second, is that their intention is recognized and the third is that
the recognition of their intention serves as a reason for the listener to react in the way the actor
intends (Niesen, 2018, 60). Since political discourses have specific structures and strategies that
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make them functional (Dylgjerii, 2017, 20), they can be analyzed from this perspective because
they are all about doing an action with words and lexical items that effectively place emphasis on
the political attitude and the speaker’s opinion. They also manipulate the public’s opinion and
harness their consent to gain legitimate power (Dylgjerii, 2017, 20).
It is possible to determine how forceful an utterance is by the choice of words used.
Employing certain indicators of force can allow the speaker to make it clear what kind of
illocutionary act their utterance is giving. Austin and Searle still emphasize that linguistic actions
are based on triggering the literal meanings in a serious or genuine expression. They say that the
nonstandard use of language is ‘parasitic’ as in it draws on the standard use of linguistics. On the
other hand, not every speech act complies with the requirements that make explicit or literal
utterances. For this reason, Searle concerned himself more with the results since Political
speeches, for example, do not necessarily succeed because they have truths in them but their
success is rather more dependent on how the arguments are presented and so political speeches
are rather considered an ‘output’ and a process which is either spoken or written (Dylgjerii,
2017, 21). If we take this as true, then Habermas is right when he insists that in every instance,
language can be examined in terms of the three following functions; giving a proposition,
creating an intersubjective relation and finally articulating intentions. Strategic acts like threats
or bargaining and even commands are a lot more difficult to assess because they do not focus on
reaching agreements from the audience but their success relies heavily on the speaker and their
status (Niesen,2018, 62).
Searle’s focus on the illocutionary act will be the main focus of this chapter as well. In
the case of speech acts against Syrian refugees in Lebanon, we are looking at the output of those
speech acts which is the prediction of racism.
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Chapter 3: Lebanese Nationalism
Lebanon is an Arab country whose population consists of mainly Muslims, Christians,
and Druze. This chapter looks at the presence of the Palestinian refugees first because Lebanon’s
policies towards their presence in Lebanon set priories to the policies that target Syrian refugees
who are the main focus of the next chapter. Analysis of the Lebanese context in terms of the
relationship between Syria and Lebanon, and Lebanon’s sociopolitical environment will provide
an understanding of the securitization of Syrian refugees in Lebanon since 2011. It will
demonstrate how Lebanon-Syria relations, historically, have created a particular sociocultural
context that has facilitated the success of securitization. Examination of the context will highlight
the most significant securitizing actors, the audience, and the various securitizing speech acts and
policy within a holistic framework. This will illustrate the dynamic between relevant actors in
the securitization process, as well as the facilitating factors that have enabled securitization.
Having a legal document that declares a person’s citizenship is essential when you are
living outside your home country. It is so because it determines a person’s belonging. It also
determines a person’s identity and so a citizenship and a national identity are meant to be fixed
attributes that are ascribed by others or sometimes self-ascribed. The problem that Palestinians in
Lebanon have is that many of the basic civil rights are unattainable since they are internationally
labeled as stateless. Those who have been naturalized and are now Lebanese citizens, for them,
their national identity (Palestinian) is something and their acquired citizenship (Lebanese) is
something else.
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Nationalism and its contribution to the Us and Them Paradigm:
Policies along with institutions and state frameworks of border control are a result of social and
political struggles that are produced and shaped by contradicting structures related to migration
in a racist and capital system. Nicos Poulantzas (1978) explains that migration policies are
relationships that are materialistically condensed between various actors and social forces. With
such an understanding one can comfortably say that policies and institutions of such regimes
(illegality, residencies, etc.) can be denaturalized and historicized (Georgi, 2019, 100).
The Nation:
The ‘nation’ is an accepted social and political construct that allows for the analysis of
how easy or difficult it is for a person to move from a specific national group, to gain
membership of another national group, and to have equal rights of citizenship (Kaplan, 1981,16).
“It is an imagined political community – and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign”
(Anderson, 1983, 5-6). Constructivism is used to build this concept as it is concerned with how
norms impact the community. Norms are these intersubjective beliefs, reproduced by people,
about society and the natural world of the ‘actors’ (those who do the constructing) and their
institutions (the channels they use to communicate their construction) to determine the best
course of action (Farrell, 2002, 49). If the construction is successful, it turns into a norm that gets
embedded in the consciousness and culture of the people just the way the term ‘nation’ came to
be. Because of this, many doors were opened not for people but for ideologies that spiraled out
of control and caused more harm than good. Historian Ahmad Rida defines the nation as one
body whose life is unity, whose power is religion and whose voice is language (Firro, 2006,
537). This understanding of the nation tells us that a nation does not own a state but with
national aspirations, the sense of nationalism assigns a national identity to a particularly
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geographic piece and creates a socially constructive structure on it (Gellner, 1983 in Eriksen,
2010, 10).
Nationalism:
Nationalism makes nations possible to create. Just like ethnic ideologies, nationalism
stresses on the notion of cultural similarity, hence by application, creates boundaries that make
the other, alien or outsiders. In other words, the core of nationalism by definition is its
relationship to the state (Gellner, 1983 in Eriksen, 2010, 10).
It makes sense to think that the issue of nationalism should concern political scientists
most since the nature of the nation and what constitutes one is a core interest and area of
research. Both nationalism and national movements are phenomena that should not be studied on
their own. As in one must take into consideration the social and class structure of the society they
take place in (Berberoglu, 1999, 79). Nationalist movements are unique political movements that
strive on the assumptions of nationalism and thrive in a society where nationalism is a cultural
aspect that is rooted deep in it (Gelvin, 2009, 12). For nationalist movements to thrive, the
community should believe in them.
Nationalism postulates that because of common interests, classes within a particular
ethnic group, people of a ‘racial’ minority should stand together economically and politically to
achieve their collective interest against other ‘nations’ or races (Berberoglu, 1999,79).
Historically speaking, nationalism is an ideology that emerged as a promise of ‘protection’ of
citizens’ rights against monarchies. It then turned into an ideology that political actors use as a
justification to human rights violations (Yazici, 2019, 147). National struggles in the Middle East
have taken the form of anti-colonial fights just like in India, China, Algeria and Cuba
(Berberoglu, 1999, 78), as national sovereignty is the only thing that can ensure the protection of
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the citizens’ and nation’s interests (Gellvin, 2009, 11). John Breuilly claims that the origins of
nationalism stemmed from a focus on Rousseau’s advocacy for popular sovereignty and from
Herder’s claim that every nation has its unique culture (Storm, 2018, 114). Another term came
up right after from observations on how diverse entities could unite and become one like the
unification of the Dutch East Indies to form Indonesia. This form of nationalism came to be
called national unification (Storm,2018, 114). This type of unification is not exactly what we are
looking at since in the case of Lebanon, it was not that several clusters wanted to unite but the
opposite. One cluster wanted autonomy. Yet it is still relevant because of what political scientist
Gat Azar argues about that it is within people’s inherent nature to prefer people who are closer to
them than strangers. In the past, people identified with others from their tribe, ethnicity or nation
to collaborate and expel the aliens or foreign ‘invaders’. In addition, religions, especially
churches, were the hub of national organization (Storm, 2018,115). This comes to no surprise
since religious institutions were serving as the political driving forces as well.
Nationalism provided states with an ideological doctrine that centralized the state and
allowed it to control their citizens. Sociologist Andreas Wimmer argues that the idea of a
‘nation-state’ emerged from political modernization. With the political sphere becoming more
complex, elites could not depend on themselves and their fellow elites anymore but had to
mobilize at least a part of the nation to fulfill their needs (Storm, 2018, 116). In 1995, Michael
Billing published ‘Banal Nationalism’ where he expressed that nationalism does not only appear
in wars, holidays or revolutions. But it is also visible in many other aspects like food, travel,
social activities and especially mass media (Storm, 2018, 117).
Nationalism needs barriers to be able to group the ‘other’ and keep them away. Barriers
dictate what an alien must do to be naturalized. Political structure, culture, language and race are
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all examples of barriers that prevent an immigrant from becoming a citizen (Kaplan, 1981,16).
When nationalism conforms with protectionist or political ideas it becomes closely related to
culture which is why nationalism still manages to prosper under corrupt regimes. Political
nationalism creates many obstacles for naturalization. The potential citizen would have to go
through a process to learn the language, cultures, customs, etc. before they become legitimate
citizens. And there is no guarantee that they will be even after going through the naturalization
process.

The first tweet above calls refugees ‘guests’ and Lebanon a ‘host’. In a sense, this alludes
to temporariness of refugees’ stay in Lebanon. Bassil is essentially saying that mass
displacement causes divisions among the guests and host and causes radicalness which leads to
‘terrorism’. He says that both radicalism and terrorism are synonyms to oppressing religious
freedom. Racial nationalism is one type that is especially relevant to this discussion. For this type
of racism, each person belongs to a community just because they inherited certain traits that give
them a permanent ethnic identity (Kaplan, 1981, 17-18). Collective identities create sufficient
conditions or ‘social security issues’ (Roe, 2012, 284). The second tweet above uses the word
‘threat’ to distinguish the ‘other’. Bassil says: “the biggest threat to the ‘Lebanese’ formula is
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Syrian displacement and Palestinian refugeehood to our land.” In the name of nationalism and
national interests, the group of people considered as ‘others’ become securitized and labeled as a
‘threat’ to ‘national peace and security’. The way the current international system works is
dependent functionally on the suspicion of the ‘other’ that is located outside the borders of a
state. Within a given state, on the other hand, there is an assumption of ‘sameness’. Despite this
sameness, the other still lurks outside somewhere (Blanely and Inayatulla, 2000, 32). But the
question is, how to understand or deal with the ‘other’ that enters the boundaries? The state that
determines it has the ‘other’ on its land, replicates the way the international order deals with the
‘other’ within its boundaries. First the aliens are racialized and then become securitized and
looked at as a threat’ as well.

Lebanese Nationalism in Context:
Lebanese intellectuals began to weave nationalist ideas that were meant to transform later
into Arab, Syrian and Lebanese nationalisms (Firro, 2006, 535). With the massive intervention of
Europe, the Ottoman Levant was forced to enter the realm of nation-states. The discourse of the
nineteenth century was all about ‘Al Taifa’ as a nation. Yet nationalism was still a foreign idea
that was adopted by the Europeans who helped the elites make it a concept of their own
(Makdisi, 1996, 25).
Historically speaking, Syrian elites have always viewed Lebanon as belonging to ‘Greater
Syria’ during French Colonialism and even to after Lebanon’s independence in 1943. Various
political parties and religious groups challenged the validity of Lebanon’s confessional system,
as sectarian tensions along with religious grievances solidified this notion. This, with foreign
intervention, played a major role in the Lebanese Civil War of 1975. Syria was one major
intervenor that financed and armed militias that eventually took hold of political power and
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positions in the government. Hizbullah being one important actor that has much authority over
the country as Syria was one large supporter and ally of Hizbullah. Syria’s authority over
Lebanon’s internal policy-making processes rendered the Ta’if Accord which was signed in 1989
and meant to end the civil war, difficult to implement. anti-Syrian sentiments paired with a rise
in Lebanese nationalism in the late nineties manifested in the alliance of Christian and Sunni
March 14 who, together, called for the withdrawal of Syrian forces from Lebanon (Dionigi,
2017, 23). Syria’s intervention in the Lebanese affairs and post-war transition was not supposed
to last long after the end of the civil war yet it did long after the anticipated two-year period.
Syrian troops only withdrew in 2005 after immense international pressure that was especially
heightened with the assassination of Prime Minister Rafik Hariri since Syria was blamed for it.
Relations between the two countries worsened in 2004 after the Syrian intervention and
influence that resulted in the extension of President Emile Lahoud’s term in office (Geukjian,
2014, 524).
The awakening of the nationalists after the First World War was too caught up in the
ambitions and the desires of the elites. The Europeans insisted on highlighting the differences
between Christianity and Islam which provided a crucial step in legitimating their intervention in
the Middle East. The French interest in separating Lebanon from Syria became more obvious
(Makdisi,1996, 25). In 1919, the Marseille Chamber of Commerce held a ‘scientific conference’
on Syria that included specialized French scholars. Among those were Chukri Ghanem and
George Samneh. For Ghanem (a Christian), separating Damascus from Arabia would be a
violent act to the land where history came to be. The fact that Samneh was a Greek Catholic may
be why he rejected the idea of a Greater Lebanon as opposed to Ghanem who was a Maronite
from Mount Lebanon as the Maronites were the leaders of the construction of the Lebanese
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national identity. Carol Hakim (2013) holds personal motives and economic goals as the origin
of the construction of Lebanese nationalism. Contrary to the works of many historians, the
reason is not because of tradition or origin, but to use nationalism as a tool to suit personal
purposes (Hakim, 2013,16).
Maronite clergy men established ‘Qaaem maqamiya’ as a regime in 1842 after making
Mount Lebanon a political unit in 1840s. then because of the sectarian massacres in 1860
(Hakim, 2013, 107-108) and a new regime came in place called the Mutasarrifiyya in 1861
(Firro,2004, 15). With the Mutesarrifate being established in Mount Lebanon, it meant that the
Lebanese identity was legally defined and so the Lebanese can enjoy ‘citizenship’ (Salibi, 1971,
78). To encourage Muslims to cooperate, Christian-Lebanese leaders modified ‘Lebanese
nationalism’ to adapt it to multi-communal status. The search for a common denominator thus
began. The main person steering this search was Michel Chiha who studied at the Jesuit schools.
In 1921 he joined the group of supporters of the French mandate to create a political party with
the slogan of ‘For Lebanon with France’ and also joined ‘The New Phoenicians’ headed by
Charles Corm. With the French’s help, Lebanon could achieve its desire to evolve its national
framework its history has been emphasizing (Makdisi, 1996, 24).
Those who framed the mandate actually thought that it would be an improvement on
colonialism. The outcome, however, was not at all as they intended (Sluglett, 2014, 425). During
the early years of the French Mandate, Lebanese nationalists tried to promote Lebanon as a
refuge and a place of freedom as an alternative to Phoenicianism (Salibi, 1971, 85). Creating
Lebanon could not have been possible without the support of the elites, in name, the Maronites
who strongly stress on their French character. They used their historical ties to the French and
held themselves superior and the natural leaders on an independent Lebanon. Chiha realized that
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it is important for economic reasons to alternate people’s behavior. In 1926 during the Syrian
revolution (1925 to 1927), Maronite intellectuals along with Maronite leaders had a fear that the
French might reverse the territory plans to favor the Muslims. Chiha was in charge of drafting
the Lebanese constitution. A draft of the constitution was presented in May 1926 to the
Representative Council. Without giving the members enough time to negotiate the draft, the
High Commissioner approved it as a final version (Firro, 2004, 17-18).

The Republic of Lebanon:
The Lebanese Republic was created in 1929 giving the Maronite elites the biggest share
of power that was supplemental in 1943 by a National Pact that gave Lebanon its formal
independence (Makdisi, 1996, 25). The National Pact, which was the result of compromises by
the elites, legitimated the patronage system and the division of the spoils among those elites
(Makdisi, 25, 1996). The Maronite elites were given the presidency, the Sunnis the prime
ministership and the Shi’ia the speaker of parliament position (Makdisi, 1996, 25). The
constitution was supposed to create a base for sharing in the process of nation-building. Chiha
thought that Lebanese nationalism which was articulated by Christian intellectuals during and
after the First World War could possibly unite the multiple loyalties into one ‘nation’. This
history tells us that the Lebanese are descendants of many ‘races’ and not just the Phoenicians.
Different races merged with the Lebanese throughout the centuries, so they are neither of Semitic
race nor a Semetic culture. Chiha envisions the revival of the characteristics of the Phoenicians
who are a mixture of races that equally nurtured the national identity through Mediterraneanism.
The Arabic language is the language of the Lebanese but even though Lebanon was Arabic
speaking, they insisted that their country plays a role in bridging the East and the West as well as
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serving as a safe haven for religious coexisting. For this, it was essential for Lebanon to remain
bilingual (Gordon, 1979, 7).
Lebanon’s bilingualism directly contributed to the problem of the split personality
Lebanon has (Sayigh, 1965, 122). Its chameleon-like behavior towards the East and the West is
what contributes to its constant search for its identity. For Chiha, Lebanese nationalism is about
more than a mere ideological construct to evade Arabism and eliminate its alleged ‘threat’ of
turning into the national ideology of modern Lebanon. Perhaps it started this way and got out of
the hands of the elites due to the French control. Lebanese Christians and the French ones
consider Lebanon a Mediterranean country acting like a bridge between the East and the West
without being wholly one or the other. In the case of other bilingual or even multilingual
countries like Belgium or Switzerland, languages are not rivaling each other unlike the dynamics
in Lebanon (Sayigh, 1965, 122). Farjalla Haik wrote a book called ‘Dieu est Libanais’ in 1946
that is a resource for anyone trying to understand the kind of special relationship between
Lebanon and France. In his book, he is adamant on describing the Lebanese as ‘white’ (Sayigh,
1965, 127). His description of Lebanon’s whiteness is relevant in the racist process of
securitization against those deemed as ‘threats’ to their non-existent whiteness that rules their
current identity.
The Lebanese territory in the mandate came to be in its current form as a result of
persistent history in its core area, Mount Lebanon (Faruki, 1974, 24). Today, it is impossible to
draw a line between politics, religion, culture and language. History shows us how religious
loyalties turned into political ones. Even though Lebanese Christians are a minority in Lebanon,
they believe and carry themselves as a majority (Sayigh, 1965, 120). Adding to their
consideration of themselves as ‘white’ and non-Arab speaking per se. Decades after gaining
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independence, Lebanon is still lacking consensus over its history. Not having one unified
recollection of origins leaves Lebanon in an ideological crisis (Hazran, 2009,460).
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Chapter 4: Syrian Refugees in Lebanon

In 2011, Syrian refugees fled the civil war in Syria. The scope and rapidity of their
exodus grew at an alarming rate to become called a ‘Syrian refugees crisis’. While it may have
been that they were obliged to leave the country in fear for their life, their movement into other
countries created consequences that affected the host countries.
Migrant or Refugee Debate:
Securitization shifted the political discourse on refugeehood and migration from having a
humanitarian perspective to be framed as a security threat. This shift influenced policies on
immigration and asylum seeking to the extent that the humanitarian concern about the well-being
of individuals crossing borders from war-torn countries was replaced by a different perception.
One that sees those migrants/refugees or asylum seekers as threats to the well-being of the
citizens of the receiving state. The migrant/ refugee issue has been given much weight especially
in the media and it has certainly been politicized. The civil wars that took place in the 1990s and
caused a large influx of migrants had significant implications on the receiving states whether
politically, economically or socially (Lohrmann, 2000, 4). The securitization of migration is a
mere expressive means of linking migration to terrorism to globalize security and attempt to deal
with terrorism and security threats post 9/11 incident (Humphrey, 2013, 179). The discussions on
migration and security in Europe focused on the securitization of asylum seekers and about the
burdens refugees and migrants pose as on national identity (Loescher, and Milner, 2005, 29).
Such narratives resulted in the securitization of vulnerable peoples who were framed as a source
of both direct and indirect threats that take multiple forms including, terrorism, economic
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instability, and social instability. Lohrmann explains that even if migrants do cause instability,
there is a difference between real and perceived threats. Fears of migration and refugeehood can
be exaggerated yet the perception of threats is what influences policies that try to curb migration
related issues (Lohrmann, 2000, 6).
Based on this, the process of securitization of migrants is purely political and rooted in
foundational suppositions and ungrounded fears towards an unwanted population in the host
state. Immigrants and refugees are mostly portrayed as a danger to the collective livelihood. The
attitudes that add fuel to the fire are heightened by intense alienation that establish a stronger
sense of belonging and union among the receiving population to protect their collective identity
and face the existential threat that is perceived (Huysmans, 2006, 47). This framing of migrants
as an existential threat is an essential political tool that works to reinforce unity of a community
(Huysmans, 2006, 49). Bigo suggests that there is a direct relation between security and
migration that is essentially political and adds that the word ‘migrant’ is a label that deems
someone a threat to the values of the host state (Bigo, 2002, 71).
The debate on what constitutes a refugee and migrant is an ever-recurring one. Those two
words were created to describe an individual that moves from one place to another along with
their living conditions (Sajjad,2018, 42). Migrants and refugees have entailed laws, statutes or
practices that constitute those international borders in an attempt to govern or regulate the
movement between those borders (Czajka, 2014, 158). Examining this phenomenon shows a
complicated political dynamic between the power to make someone legitimate and giving them
access to their rights based on how ‘worthy’ or innocent they are instead of this process being an
objective means to granting people sanctuary.
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Lebanon is one of the host countries that was affected by the refugee flow. This should
not sound as an exaggeration given the geographic proximity, and the historical as well as social
ties. Yet these same connections dictate the attitude and sentiments of the Lebanese towards the
issue of the refugees. The Lebanese government has always been adamant to adopt a policy of
‘disassociation’ which was expressed time and again in the media especially by Saad Hariri. The
objective was to stay out of the conflict while preventing the spill-over effect the conflict may
have which could result in the destabilization of Lebanon. The rationale behind this policy is
well understood among regional and international powers given Lebanon's precarious ties with
Syria. However, Hizbullah’s involvement in the Syrian conflict makes it difficult for Lebanon to
disassociate itself at least politically. With the great number of refugees living in Lebanon, the
state cannot distance itself. Since the beginning of the Syrian civil strife, Lebanon’s policy of
neglect has shaped the de facto relationship of the Lebanese government towards the
humanitarian crisis of the refugees. The basic needs of shelter, education, access to health
services and so on have been provided by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR) without Lebanese government being involved in the process whatsoever. The
Lebanese government gave permission to different NGOs and religious charities to take care of
providing the refugees with assistance along with UNHCR which added fuel to the sectarian fire
already existing in Lebanon. The religious charities were unsupervised and dominated the
provision of aid to the refugees while approaching the refugees with sectarian strategies.
Lebanon, according to UNHCR, does not have any legislation on how to deal with either
refugees or asylum seekers. The refugees face risks of detention, arrest and deportation in
addition to having very few legal means to support themselves and their families. Without a legal
framework, the refugees are left with little choice and high dependence on UNHCR. Practically
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speaking, the local charities along with the municipalities give the most efficient aid given that
they are on the ground with the refugees playing their host communities. With no clear legal
framework, Syrian refugees have no legal sources to base their claim to basic rights and
protection within Lebanon making them recognized as ‘illegal bodies’.
The shared history between Syria and Lebanon ever since the domination of the Ottoman
Empire and later the division that came with the French mandate shaped the current relationship
between both states. Geography also brought Syrians and Lebanese close along with inter-family
relations and migration. Since 1943, after gaining independence from the French occupation,
Syria would not recognize Lebanon as an independent state with its own sovereignty. What made
matters tenser later was the Lebanese Civil War between 1975 and 1990 when Syria’s army was
in Lebanon. The final retreat of Syria’s army eventually happened as resentment grew more n
2005 after the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri. As a result, there are two
prevalent political blocs. One is March 14, who is against the current Syrian regime and March 8
who is pro the Syrian regime. What constitutes a fear of the refugees is the Sunni Shi’i tension
especially in the Beqaa Valley and also the Sunni Alawite rivalry in Tripoli. Both areas are hosts
to the majority of refugees.
The history and the current history that is being made are tangibly translated in speech
acts produced by the Lebanese against the refugees and their presence in Lebanon. The Lebanese
government has politicized the refugee crisis framing them as security threats and calling for
their return to Syria. After being constructed as such, there is pretty much no limit to methods
used to terminate this threat. Political elites who are considered credible in the eyes of their
audience play the role of the securitizing actor and need to convince their constituents of the
existence of the threat to gain legitimacy for the measures they plan to use against the threat. The
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threat is usually constructed as one to the nation’s identity, a threat to the livelihood of the
community or any other social entity. After this is achieved through speech acts, the abnormal
measures taken against the threat are legitimized because the audience accepted the existence of
the threat and authorized the securitizing actor to end it.
Even though Syrian refugees fled their country in fear for their life, they are subject to the
process of securitization in Lebanon. International organizations present refugees as victims of
war who are forced to leave their home country to escape persecution. UNHCR defines a refugee
as somebody who was forced to flee their home because of persecution, war or violence.
Persecution includes reasons like race, religion, political views or being members of a given
social group. In most cases, they cannot return or are merely afraid of doing so (UNHCR). Issues
related to refugees are considered issues of human rights and considered embedded in
international law. This definition paints the picture that a refugee is a victim who escaped
persecution and needs protection. In light of this, a refugee status and security issues are not
exactly to lines that run parallel but intersect as cause and effect with security or lack of it is the
cause for the existence of refugees. For this, the case of the Syrian refugees in Lebanon is an
optimum one to study the contemporary discourse of securitization and how racism is
produced through securitizing speech acts against those refugees.

Lebanon and the Palestinian Refugees:
Lebanon’s past experience with and sentiments towards Palestinian refugees in Lebanon
set a priory to the current attitude and policy-making towards the Syrian refugees. So far, the
concept of identity has been explained as a mere social construct and it is possible to be imposed
for political reasons and that the aspect of national identity is one dimension of a person’s
identity. Identity can also be defined separate from what is on passports and identity cards. It can
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be considered a tool that allows people to make sense of themselves in their social environment.
It is a means that individuals use to understand who they are in the social context they belong to
(Elbedour et al., 1997, 217). Identity, in short, gives people a sense of belonging as well as
providing opportunities and even setting constraints.
Lebanon fears that Syrian refugees would become permanent residents just like
Palestinian refugees and this fear is the active factor in the way refugees are perceived and
accepted as a threat to Lebanon’s national and social security. Lebanon faced a great influx of
over 120,000 Palestinian refugees due to the 1948 Nakba (Russel, 1985, 18). Palestinian militias
gradually grew in power financially and politically influencing the Palestinian Liberation
Organization (PLO) which caused tension between secular groups and political ones in Lebanon.
Furthermore, the Cairo Agreement that gave administrative autonomy to Palestinian camps
allowed for attacks on Israel from Lebanese land creating more fear among the Lebanese
population and Christians in particular. The perception of the Lebanese towards Palestinian
refugees was that of death of Lebanese life and destruction of its society, which turned the
Palestinian cause to a Palestinian problem. This made the Lebanese call for the prohibition of
Palestinians from having either political or social rights.
Until this day, the Lebanese are bitter towards the PLO and the role it is playing. This
resentment manifests through discrimination against close to half a million registered Palestinian
refugees. After the Lebanese civil war, discourse involving the Palestinian refugees was
intensely securitizing and political. The Palestinian refugees were portrayed as a catalyst of destability to the government’s confessional system of power that barely balanced the power
between Christians and Muslims in Lebanon (Czajka, 2012, 243). The political discourse that
dominates regarding the Palestinians’ situation in Lebanon among the political elites and the
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Lebanese population involves denying the refugees any civil or social rights since this can be
seen as a political concession to Israel (Czajka, 2012, 244).
Becoming a Racialized Other:
Palestinians, like the Syrians who are the focus of this thesis, belong to a socially and
politically constructed category called the Arab race. With their nationality being Palestinian,
their status deemed stateless and their acquired label ‘refugees’, they become subject to
institutionalized racism. The Lebanese government reinforces this kind of racism through
processes of expulsion and alienation. The Lebanese authorities separated the Palestinians
according to sect and class. The middle class were given the privilege of freely settling in
Lebanon and were able to gain civil rights and get jobs. Christian Palestinians were able to
obtain the Lebanese nationality easily. On the other hand, middle-class and poor Muslim
Palestinians had a much different experience. They were excluded from the privileges their
Christian fellow nationals had (Siklawi, 2010, 599).

Exodus for Lebanon:
In 2011, Syria started its crackdown on the uprisings. As this happened, Lebanon, a multi
sectarian country with 4.5 million people, received more than a million Syrian refugees
(Fakhoury, 2017, 682). The war in Syria created one of the greatest outflows of refugees since
the Second World War (Kaushal, 2019,138), and because of Lebanon’s open border policy with
Syria, a large number of Syrians took refuge there (Azzam, 2015, 71). Empirically speaking,
Lebanon is a fragile state with regards to its political, economic and social sectors. The
geographic proximity between Lebanon and Syria and the historical pre-existing tensions
between different religious and ethnic groups made it even more vulnerable with the spillover of
refugees (Young et al, 29, 2014). In 2010, the Failed State Index ranked Lebanon 34 out of 60
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compared to Syria which ranked 48 (Young et al, 2014, 29). Even if it is not that high in rank as
a failed state, it may as well be considered one because unlike other neighboring countries, it is
not completely sovereign, as in there is not one entity that totally monopolizes power in Lebanon
to force border control (Salem, 2012,3). This lack of total sovereignty sometimes brings a
deadlock in policy. What added oil to the fire already was the influx of refugees that began to
cause a tilt in the sectarian balance in Lebanon, which in turn sparked the historical hatred preexisting between Sunnis and Shi’is (Young et al, 25, 2014), with the Christians caught in the
middle of it. A minority for sure, but a very powerful one.
Since Lebanon opened the country for the refugees, the international community has been
praising the Lebanese generosity and resilience. Other experts, however, have dubbed Lebanon’s
strategy with the refugees as shortsighted and ‘the policy of no policy’ (Fakhoury, 2017, 682).
Statistically, the Syrian refugees exist in almost 1,600 informal settlements where sixty percent
of those registered with a refugee status settled in northern Lebanon and the Beqaa Valley which
are two of the poorest areas in Lebanon (Azzam, 2015, 71). The first wave of refugees crossed
the border on May 11, 2011 fleeing the town of Talkalakh and settling in Akkar (Salem, 2012,8).
Tens of thousands crossed the border to stay with friends or in hotels or rent apartments and
made the country their temporary home (Salem, 2012,8).
From 2011 to 2013, Lebanon kept an open-border policy while calling Syrian refugees
as ‘displaced’ or in Arabic ‘Nazihoun’ that needed assistance. Lebanon at that time formed a
‘low-intensity’ type of governance to refugee governance with the increasing number of border
crossings (Fakhoury, 2017, 685). Lebanon was about to be shaken soon as there has been a rise
of violent acts by Lebanese citizens against Syrian refugees following the crisis of Arsal (Azzam,
2015, 72). This crisis took place on August, 2, 2014 after the arrest of the commander of a Syrian
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rebel group connected to al Qaeda’s Jabhat Al Nusra (Nusra Front), Imad Ahmad Jumaa.
Allegedly, Sunni militias entered Arsal, a town close to the Syrian border, and kidnapped 30
Lebanese policemen and soldiers to execute 4 of them and release only seven. Human Rights
Watch documented a total of eleven attacks during August and September, 2014 by Lebanese
citizens on Sryians. Those attacks include shootings and arson, targeting the informal refugee
settlements (Azzam, 2015, 72). On September 19 and 25, 2014, the Lebanese army raided
several refugee settlements and arrested 450 refugees for allegedly participating in terrorist acts
with 30 of them currently in prison. Then in October 2014, the Lebanese government decided to
enforce a strict policy of displacement and even stricter border control to curb the influx with the
exception of humanitarian cases (Fakhoury, 2017, 686). On October 23, 2014, the government
decided it would not allow any Syrian refugees except for pressing humanitarian cases (Azzam,
2015, 71). The Lebanese government’s policy of October 2014 was supposedly aimed at
preserving the stability and security of the Lebanese state and to make sure that the Syrina
refugees remain illegal (Favier,2016, 1). The government eventually approved a Policy Paper on
those displaced that was meant to reduce their number within the country by increasing the laws
regulating their stay (Favier ,2016,2).
On December 6, Syrian refugee tents were burned down by locals after demanding that
Syrians should leave their village. These attacks are seen to have religion-related reasons since
most of the Syrian refugees are Muslim Sunnis, according to UNHCR that estimates a figure of
96% (Azzam, 2015, 72). Then on December 7, 2014, an unidentified male set fire to a refugee
settlement in Akkar. The policy that was decided on in October was eventually effective in
January 2015 after General Security closed the borders to introduce the new Entry and Renewal
of Residency Permit. These new regulations left almost 80% of Syrian refugees without a ‘legal’
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residency permit (Favier, 2016, 2). In addition, when it comes to long term residencies, Syrians
who could not register with UNHCR as refugees had to find a Lebanese citizen who would be
willing to be their ‘guarantor’ or ‘Kafil’. And those who are already registered with UNHCR
before May 2015, must sign a pledge not to work (Fakhoury, 2017, 687). This 2015 policy
classified the refugees into three large categories: a small minority that is wealthy enough to get
a 3-year residency permit, refugees who have been registered with UNHCR before this policy
took effect and are not permitted to work and finally unregistered refugees who work in
agriculture, construction or environment sector. These have to have a sponsor (Favier,2016,2).
By May 2015, UNHCR stopped all processes of refugee registration based on the Lebanese
Government’s request. After that, different forms of visas were to be issued for the following
categories: tourist, students, medical, short-stays, transit and business. These categories do not
cover the status of a refugee which requires a lot of and difficult paperwork to obtain or renew
residencies (Fakhoury, 2017, 687). The lack of this legal document for the majority of the
refugees immensely in. As a result of this policy, there have been temporary arrests, detentions
and even imposition of curfews in some communities (Favier ,2016,2). The negative sentiments
against the refugees could not have been developed if it was not due to the unique political
system in Lebanon. Yet those negative sentiments that were manifested in the speech acts against
the refugees may not have had the impact they do if it was not for the unique power structure in
Lebanon.
Each sector or political bloc of the Lebanese government has a different stance towards
the refugees and takes a different approach in talking about them, addressing them, and dealing
with their situation. Lebanon’s controversial power sharing system requires formations of
coalitions governments between a Maronite as a president, a Sunni as the Prime Minister and a
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Shi’i as the leader of legislature (Fakhoury, 2017, 682). Political motivation along with
ideological one among Christians and Shi’i see the ‘implantation’ of a majority Sunni population
of refugees poses a challenge to the balance of the political system in Lebanon (Favier,3 ,2016).
Along with the displacement rose the fear that law enforcement entities would not be able to rule
out terrorists from refugees and the fear that the help the refugees would be getting could end up
helping terrorists instead. In light of this, refugees are looked upon as opportunist terrorists in
hiding (Kaushal, 2019,138). The Lebanese President, for one, expressed caution that Lebanon is
dealing with a ‘survival crisis’ because of the overpowering influx of refugees (Azzam, 72,
2015). Because of this, since 2016, political framings of the Syrian refugees’ living in Lebanon
as a ‘threat’ to the power-sharing system lead to having the issue of their repatriation in the
center of political proceedings (Fakhoury, 2017, 689). Michel Aoun’s party (the Free Patriotic
Movement) and their representative were one of the main users of the anti-refugee discourse.
Aoun said that “there would be no solution in Syria without the Syrian refugees’ return to their
country” (Favier,2016, 1).
Political parties got heavily divided between pro-Syrian and anti-Syrian categories which
in turn created a deadlock in policy and postponement of the elections (Young et al, 2014, 26).
As the number began to increase dramatically to become destabilizing echoing the issue of the
Palestinian refugees and Lebanon’s experience with them in the 1970s (Salem, 2012, 8), the
depiction of the refugees as a ‘threat’ to the country’s national fabric began with Amin Gemayel
who is the former leader of the Kata’ib party. He called for the establishment of camps at the
Lebanese Syrian border to control the ‘haphazard distribution’ as he puts it (Fakhoury, 2017,
689). Lebanon refused to build official camps and this does not reflect on their desire to include
refugees but their refusal has economic and security rationale (Fakhoury, 2017, 686). To be able
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to legitimize their discourse regarding the economic and security reasoning, Lebanon’s political
elites cite their experience with Palestinian camps and the threat of refugee camps turning into a
hub of conflict (Fakhoury, 2017, 686). Marwan Charbel, Lebanon’s former, Minister of Interior,
stressed that some refugees happen to be rebel fighters and so they pose a threat to Lebanon’s
security (Azzam, 2015, 72). Just as the Hungarian prime minister Viktor Orban called the
refugees’ migration to Europe a ‘Trojan horse of terrorism’ (Kaushal,139, 2019), and then,
Marco Rubio, U.S. Senator said: “This is the problem. You allow 10,000 people in and 9,999 of
them turn out innocent but one of them is a well-trained ISIS fighter” (Kaushal, 2019,139), The
leader of the Lebanese Forces Samir Geagea emphasized that the experience of Lebanon with
Palestinian refugees militarization back in 1975 must not be replicated (Fakhoury, 2017, 689),
Even though the flow of refugees is more regional and to a large extent confined to neighboring
countries of Jordan and Turkey as well, the fear and the suspicion that were ignited by the large
flow to Lebanon aggravated anxiety that stems from fundamental domestic issues the host
countries already have (Kaushal, 2019,139), as the negative discourse initiated against the
refugees is rooted in the historically complex relationship between the two countries (Favier
,2016,3).
The troublesome relationship started with the assassination of former Lebanese Sunni
Prime Minister Rafik Hariri is 2005 that turned the Lebanese on the Assad regime in Syria and
their presence in Lebanon. The March 14 coalition along with Christian and Druze parties
formed the anti-Syrian coalition and demanded the Syrian troops’ withdrawal from Lebanon. In
the meantime, Syria’s allies in Lebanon headed by Hizbullah formed the March 8 coalition along
with Shi’i Amal Movement and other parties to support Syria backed by Iran (Salem, 2012,3). In
this respect, it is not surprising for such rivalry to result in detrimental impact on Syrian refugees
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residing in Lebanon. Sectarian tensions have peaked rapidly during this time (Salem, 2012,4). To
make matters even more daunting for the refugees, public surveys further showed that Lebanese
citizens perceive Syrian refugees as a factor of insecurity (Fakhoury, 2017, 686). These surveys
express that the flow of refugees created dilemmas of both moral and national security (Kaushal,
2019,140). In Lebanon’s fractured elite model, securitized discourses contributed to the plethora
of negative stances against the Syrian refugees’ presence which in turn led to the Syrian file
being seen as an instrument to push different agendas (Fakhoury, 2017, 690). Policy makers for
example have explained the lack of resources to the outstretched Lebanese capacity because of
the Syrian refugees. Unemployment and the deterioration of the economy were also justified by
their presence (Fakhoury, 2017, 690). This hatred caused violent clashes on the Syrian Lebanese
border and even bombings in Beirut (Young et al, 2014, 26).
In addition, Lebanese Christian political parties sought to consolidate their position as
protectors and defenders of the rights of minorities and Christians in the Middle East in general
and their communities in particular (Fakhoury, 2017, 693). March 14 actors along with March 8
ones used the Syrian refugees as a trump card for their political arrangements (Fakhoury, 2017,
693). “In a statement, the Lebanon-based Access Center for Human Rights called for “the
Lebanese authorities and political forces to neutralize the Syrian refugees file in the political
arena, and not draw it into the popular protest movement. And to not use the Syrian refugee file
as a reason for the lack of success of the Lebanese government in the rescue of the Lebanese
people” (Syria Direct, paragraph 6).
March 14 coalition, who is anti-Syrian, blamed Miqati’s government for failing to
protect the Syrian opposition figures living in Lebanon (Fakhoury, 2017, 693). As for the
Lebanese state as a whole, it used the displacement of the refugees as a leverage point in the
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international community as a state that is ‘keeping those migrants away from the West’ making it
emerge as a useful partner of the European Union (Fakhoury,2017 693,). Christians play a
crucial political role since they hold the key position of the presidency and head of the army
which both helped keep a middle ground between the Sunnis and the Shi’i (Salem, 2012,8).
Nevertheless, and even if it appears like the government has it together, because of this system,
elite leaders are prompted to try to outbid each other and take care of growing external alliances
to maintain their position (Fakhoury, 2017, 682). For example, in April 2016, former French
President Francois Hollande visited Lebanon. Maronite Christian figures who compose the
Maronite League wrote a letter to Holland asking France to do what is necessary and side with
the parties that propagate the Syrian refugee’s return to safe zones in their home country. Their
letter illustrates how the presence of the Syrian refugees is a factor that could disrupt Lebanon’s
political settlement postwar that depends heavily on the delicate balance between the Christians
and the Muslims (Fakhoury, 2017, 689).
The Christian community is playing an interesting role as a buffer between the Sunni and
the Shi’i. Part of the reason is geography as the armed Sunni groups are in the north and the Shi’i
in the south leaving the Christian stretched from south Tripoli to east Beirut (Salem, 2012,8). An
interesting example of the Sunni Shi’i clash is the direct spillover of refugees that is clear in
Tripoli between the Sunni neighborhood of Bab Al Tabbana and the Alawite dominant
neighborhood of Jabal Mohsen (Young et al, 2014, 28). What is interesting and disproves the
generalization of the link the government makes between the refugees and military attacks is that
the friction between both these neighborhoods was there before the existence of the Syrian
refugees because Bab Al Tabbana would initiate skirmishes against the Alawites in Jabal
Mohsen (Young et al, 2014, 28).
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Sunni leaders who were originally for the policy of hospitality in the beginning have
warned about the security threat the presence of the refugees represents. International funding
and Lebanon’s reliance on it made matters worse and rather changed into a topic of contestations
among the different political parties (Fakhoury, 2017, 692). Some of these parties lobbied to get
more international funding to ease the strain of the refugees’ presence while others expressed the
negative impact such funding has on Lebanon as a host community (Fakhoury, 2017, 692).
Preferential treatment on the international community’s part of the Syrian refugees created
tension between the refugees and their host communities (Young et al, 2014, 28). Different
communities that resented the existence of the refugees among them started to drive them out to
areas where ethnic divisions are uneasy thus making them even more vulnerable against
sectarian conflict (Young et al, 2014, 28).
As a result, different Lebanese political parties chose to provide refugees relief if they
adhere to their own political orientation on some occasions. Sunni parties, for example, have not
been helping refugees who are supporters of Assad’s regime. Former Minister of Interior and
member of the Sunni party Future Current Nouhad Machnouk threatened the Syrians who are
living in Lebanon would have their refugee status stripped from them if they returned to Syria to
vote in the 2014 Syrian presidential elections. His reason was fear of politicization and friction
(Fakhoury, 2017, 689).
Lebanon has developed a historical commitment since the Ottoman empire to adopt a
decentralization strategy (Boustani et. al, 2016, 11). Back in 1977, a progressive decentralization
law was passed that enabled municipalities to have financial independence, responsibilities and
authority that echoed this commitment (Boustani et. al, 2016, 14). Municipal officials of
bordering communities implemented even harsher procedures policing the refugees living within
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their municipalities to the extent of restricting Syrians’ movement and gatherings (Fakhoury,
2017, 687). Religious institutions, through their agencies like churches and mosques, have
upheld the politics of humanitarianism (Fakhoury, 2017, 690). Moreover, the commitment gave
municipalities the power to exercise prerogatives within the municipality itself (Boustani et. al,
2016, 11). The restrictive movement and hardships in issuing residency papers have led to the
status of ‘illegality’ among migrants.
Lebanese municipalities resorted to enforcing law and order within their local areas by
imposing arbitrary curfews for example. Young men of the different neighborhoods were the
ones regulating municipal measures and interactions between the local Lebanese citizens and the
refugees in the area (Fakhoury, 2017, 687). The lack of a legal status made it impossible for
refugees to move around freely and at the same time made it difficult to get access to education,
health services as 70% of these refugees, in 2015, lived below the extreme poverty line (Favier,
2016,2). Due to such hardships and difficult living conditions that left 90% of refugees in debt,
they resorted to move on to a third country like Turkey where they can transit there on their way
to Europe. Then in January 2016, Turkey also implemented new regulations like making it
mandatory for Syrians coming from Lebanon to have a valid visa to enter Turkey whether by air
or sea (Favier,2016, 2). With that, Syrian refugees in Lebanon felt trapped and had only one
option left which was to return to Syria or go to a handful of countries where they do not need a
visa to enter like Malaysia and Sudan (Favier ,2016,2). In light of this, the international
community has urged Lebanon to review and monitor the municipalities’ decisions regarding the
refugees and the curfews imposed on them (Fakhoury, 2017, 691).
Different framings also constructed the Syrian refugees as an economic burden as well.
Statistically, Lebanon has the highest concentration of refugees per capita in the world (Favier,
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,20162). The ratio of refugees Lebanon is hosting is one to four Lebanese citizens (Boustani et.
al, 2016, 7). Hassan (2016) says Lebanon is estimated to have economic losses that amount to 10
billion dollars which made the government urge the international community to send more aid to
the country (Boustani et. al, 7, 2016). After the Qaa bombing in 2016, where Syrian bombers
blew up themselves in Lebanese villages in northern Lebanon, the Lebanese army began to crack
down on Syrian settlements in suspicions of military movements (Fakhoury, 2017, 687). The
Lebanese Crisis Response Plan Documents (LCRP) since 2015 created a road map to coordinate
politics, NGOs and international actors’ efforts. This document had lofty rhetoric, it clearly
expresses that Lebanon’s capacity was way overstretched along with the negative effect the
spillover of the Syrian refugees had on the country. It also calls out international funding for
targeting Syrians only while neglecting the needy Lebanese families (Fakhoury, 2017, 688),
because the jobs Syrian refugees compete with Lebanese citizens over are jobs that are
considered low-skill (Azzam, 2015, 71).
Historically speaking, refugees have proved it possible to integrate well in their host
communities. On the other hand, this integration happens at a rather slow pace if they are banned
from working. The best way to ensure integration is to treat refugees and asylum seekers as
immigrants. They should be allowed to work and become financially independent (Kaushal,
2019,149). Those who got to fully integrate in their host society stopped being refugees but those
who remained in settlements or camps still hold the status of a refugee who is banned from
integrating with the community. The ones that remain in camps give the impression that it is
impossible for refugees to integrate (Kaushal, 2019,149). Gebran Bassil, the current leader of the
FPM party, says that the money that goes to the Syrians has a much negative effect on Lebanese
farmers. Nevertheless, political coalitions in Lebanon leveraged the issue of Syrian refugees and
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received benefits from the loose response towards them in Lebanon. The leaders’
instrumentalization of divisive issues, along with the consolidation of sectarian and external
loyalties is essential to the survival of the model of governance of Lebanon (Fakhoury, 2017,
692).

Empirics and Analysis of Refugees in the Media:
Speech acts and policies that securitize migration and the Syrian refugees in Lebanon are
largely orchestrated by Lebanese politicians and government officials. The political discourse
that involves refugees is a negative one. This is not the first time Lebanon finds itself in a
dilemma related to refugees as previously explained. The Lebanese discourse regarding the
Palestinian refugees is a political one that is established on the basis of security in the same way
the Syrian refugees’ discourse is. The language the government uses is largely hostile and always
worked within the frame of security and social threat. Syrian refugees are portrayed as an
existential threat to the homogeneity of the Lebanese society and culture, their collective identity
and the security of the state as a whole. A large part of this narrative continuously blames the
Syrian refugees for already existing issues within Lebanon.
Politicians in Lebanon are well connected with media platforms. Thanks to these
connections, the media facilitates the securitizing discourse politicians push on its various
platforms. These platforms play a major role in spreading hate speech, xenophobic among the
Lebanese population. The media’s coverage of issues related to refugees was dominated by a
fear-mongering approach that creates stereotypes to frame the refugees in a negative way.
In 2015, a study by UNDP on the Lebanese media’s coverage of Syrian and Palestinian
refugees was released containing analysis of such coverage based on a large amount of surveyed
material. This study discovered that Lebanese print media largely focused on issues of security,
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and how burdensome asylum is, as opposed to focusing on the humanitarian issues pertaining to
the condition of the refugees3. The same was found about TV coverage where much time was
allocated to frame refugees as security threats, criminals accused of rape, drugs, and assault4.
The Syrian and Palestinian refugees’ presence in Lebanon has always been a reason for
rising tension among the Lebanese population. This tension is manifested in the discourse the
media helps spread which results in discrimination and fear-mongering against strangers or
‘aliens’. It also spreads hate speech that uses narratives like identity politics, cultural differences
and national security to add fuel to the fire5. Lebanese media helped facilitate the production of
racism by labeling the migrants and refugees as an issue to the cohesion of the Lebanese
society6.
The majority of the media coverage of security has a negative attitude as issue of security
are always connected to refugees. Stories on Syrian refugees often involve using specific terms
like ‘security, threat, fear’7. Anchors and influential personas delivered stories with clear bias
and hate to frequently accuse Syrian refugees of ridding Lebanese people from job opportunities,
committing crimes against Lebanese citizens to justify crimes and discrimination against those
refugees8. Narratives such as those are spread throughout the nation for citizens to accept and
when they do, the people help spread false stories about the refugees hence solidifying the claims
in the media. This makes it easier to securitize refugees in the name of having to deal with this
imminent threat with extreme political action. Racial prejudice and bias against refugees are

3

http://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/listeningpost/2017/10/fear-loathing-syrian-refugees-lebanon171028121205744.html
4
https://www.maharat-news.com/Temp/Attachments/6e546361-c10b-448c-b019-19490547bc99.pdf
5
https://www.maharat-news.com/Temp/Attachments/6e546361-c10b-448c-b019-19490547bc99.pdf
6
https://www.maharat-news.com/Temp/Attachments/6e546361-c10b-448c-b019-19490547bc99.pdf
7
https://www.maharat-news.com/Temp/Attachments/6e546361-c10b-448c-b019-19490547bc99.pdf
8
https://www.peaceinsight.org/blog/2017/08/refugees-and-media-lebanon/
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dominating all media platforms marginalizing Syrian refugees and making them feel at risk all
the time. These refugees have continuously been treated with immense hostility as large
populations rally to promote their evacuation and call for violence and tighter control over them.
The presence of the Syrian refugees and the racism produced against them served and
still serves as a mask of the government’s inability to govern. New cultural spaces or borders,
identities and so on have started a wave of panic among the dominant groups and who control
modes of representation (Giroux, 1993, 105) in Lebanon. Within this context, it is obvious that if
the refugees were to disappear right now from Lebanon, the different governmental coalitions
would still find another way to consolidate their position as ruling elites. Wissam Matta, a
journalist and political analyst, says in a report9 “The phenomenon of racism or hate speech
towards the Syrians in Lebanon is not new; it has always been present in the country, especially
in some sectarian environments, and particularly the Christian communities, which have
obsessions about ‘the minority’ and show high sensitivity when it comes to what they label as
‘the stranger’, although such sentiments of dismay at different communities are not limited to
‘the stranger’ who holds a different nationality. Rather, they are particularly directed at Lebanese
people belonging to different sectarian groups. Racism is therefore a multifaceted phenomenon
in Lebanese society, and it is sectarian in essence.” As a result, evoking language and images of
national unity helped the conservative (Lebanese) government attack multiculturalism and deem
it as a threat to their own culture and identity. They did so with slogans and media campaigns
that highlight the differences they have with the new occupants.
To be able to look at what is explained so far, I looked at what different politicians said on either
traditional media platforms or on social media.
9

https://fanack.com/refugees/racist-rhetoric-against-syrians-in-lebanon/

66

Former Minister of foreign Affairs Gebran Bassil, for one, has always been vocal about
the ‘burden’ of the ‘displaced’ Syrians as he puts it as he often makes controversial statements
regarding this. He makes sure he is explicit when talking about Syrian refugees calling them a
‘threat’ to Lebanon10. He also explicitly said that Lebanon does not accept Syrians as ‘refugees’
but rather as ‘migrants and ‘displaced’ as he pushes for talks of their repatriation11. In 2019,
Bassil posted a video on Twitter that showed Lebanese people protesting because a restaurant
hired Syrian workers. His caption partially reads: ‘You love Lebanon...hire Lebanese’12.
Bassil has previously been accused of hate speech and especially criticized for being
involved in a xenophobic campaign targeting refugees for political purposes. With supporters of
this discourse, Bassil argued that his efforts are no more than attempts to pressurize those who
violate the labor law that prevents Syrians from having access to jobs13. In addition, many other
political figures referred to the refugee crisis as an issue that is ‘choking’ Lebanon 14.
Both domestically and internationally, former Prime Minister Saad Hariri also
emphasized how much of a burden Syrian refugees are on Lebanon’s limited resources and
feeble infrastructure. He warned about the severe consequences in March 2019 and asked for
$2.6 billion at the third Brussels Conference on Supporting the Future and the Region from the
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http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Lebanon-News/2015/Oct-28/320611-refugees-posing-existentialcrisis-bassil.ashx
11
https://www.thenational.ae/world/gebran-bassil-lebanon-does-not-accept-syrians-as-refugees-1.773658
12
https://twitter.com/Gebran_Bassil/status/1137350356931928064
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https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/anti-syrian-refugee-sentiment-rampsincreasingly-unwelcomelebanon.
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https://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2017/09/02/547906231/in-lebanon-syrian-refugees-met-withharassment-and-hostility
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international community to help with the repatriation of the refugees. In his speech at the
conference, he insisted that the ‘only’ solution to the refugee crisis is their return to Syria15.
Lebanese politicians have called the international community for support in dealing with the
refugee crisis. Lebanese authorities even threatened to return refugees back home with force if
the international community does not provide them with the necessary funds while arguing that
refugees have had detrimental effects on the public services and economy since they cause many
Lebanese citizens to be unemployed16. The requests to repatriate Syrian refugees have often been
expressed with little to no concern to the unstable situation the refugees would be sent back to in
Syria 17.
Syrian refugees have also been securitized by being framed with reference to
environmental issues. Lebanese politicians and governmental officials have avoided facing those
issues and being blamed for them by blaming the refugees for the environmental crisis. Tarek
Khatib, Lebanon’s Environment Minister, called the Syrian refugees a ‘ticking bomb’ and
blamed them for the pollution in the country. He claimed that since the polluted river, Al Jaws, is
in the north, it is the Syrian displaced who loitered it by throwing waste in it instead of using the
waste bins provided for them18.
In response to this, Khatib suggested raising the level of security by giving municipal authorities
and police more resources to carry on surveillance missions and inspect the refugee camps19
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https://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Lebanon-News/2019/Mar-14/478803-hariri-arrives-in-brussels-forconference-on-refugees-future-of-syria.ashx
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https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2017/04/lebanon-funds-hosting-refugees170405082414586.html
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https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2017/04/lebanon-funds-hosting-refugees170405082414586.html
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https://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Lebanon-News/2018/Jan-08/432886-syrian-refugees-responsiblefor-river-waste-pollution-environment-minister.ashx
19
https://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Lebanon-News/2018/Jan-08/432886-syrian-refugees-responsiblefor-river-waste-pollution-environment-minister.ashx
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These suggestions along with evictions of Syrian refugees made by the Minister and other
officials reinforce the securitization discourse and allows it to disseminate when the government
frames the refugees as a burden and threat.

The tweet above was taken from Lebanon’s former Foreign Minister’s official Twitter
account. In an interview with The National, Gebran Bassil said that “they should feel at ease to
go back and (we) have to stop encouraging them to stay in Lebanon. The return of refugees has
to happen gradually, we are talking about different categories of refugees, some are economic
migrants.” He also said that “Lebanon does not accept Syrians to be refugees” The tweet above
from June, 2019 says: “We have created our own understanding of our Lebanese belonging and
put it before any other belonging, and we said it is genetic and that is the only explanation to our
similarity. We endured and adapted together because we are flexible and solid and because we
were able to come together on one hand and refuse refugeehood and displacement together, on
the other”. Bassil has been at the forefront of calling for the illegality of refugees and their
repatriation. He does not even refer to the refugees as such but uses the word ‘displaced’ instead
because the word ‘refugee’ as defined by UNHCR entitles them to be protected and taken care
of. Instead, for Lebanon it is preferable to not call them refugees in an attempt to lift the
obligation of being host and aid providers.
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Bassil has popularized the term “Lebanon above all,” while warning of an “international
conspiracy” to settle Syrians in Lebanon, like what happened with the Palestinian refugees. The
influx of Palestinian refugees, who fled or were driven out during the 1948 war surrounding the
creation of Israel, upset Lebanon’s sectarian balance, and armed Palestinian factions were a key
factor in the 1975-1990 civil war. After decades in Lebanon, the Palestinians’ numbers have
dwindled to about 175,000, living in squalid camps with no access to public services, limited
employment opportunities and no rights to ownership or protections (AP20, Paragraph 17)
The words Bassil uses in the tweet below play on the idea of belonging and that
Lebanese are biologically similar. He insinuates that refugees and those displaced are different
from the Lebanese citizens and clearly tells his constituents that they came to be as one because
they refused the other. This tweet manifests the fundamental biological understanding of racism.

On September 20, 2019, Bassil used the Lebanese nationality in his call to the citizens to be
aware that ‘strangers are trying to gain the Lebanese nationality and they will never get it’. In a
report21 by Reuters he said: “Our procedures against UNHCR begin tomorrow, and they will
escalate to the maximum extent that sovereign Lebanon can achieve toward an organization
which acts against (Lebanon’s) policy of preventing naturalization and returning the displaced to
their homeland” (Reuters, paragraph 5).
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He also used the hashtag: ‘Lebanon is for the Lebanese’ which came as a slogan used in protest
against the presence of the Syrian refugees as shown in the image22 by Bilal Jawich/Xinhuanet.
The banner on the right says
Lebanon is for the Lebanese,
we want to return the displaced.
Bassil was much criticized for
initiating racist discourse every
now and then. In the first tweet
below, he says: “It is normal for
a state to differentiate its
citizens from others meaning the foreigner
and this is not racism but what the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Racial Discrimination says; the local law is the one that dominates.

22
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Then he defends himself in the second tweet by saying that some (people) accuse him of
being racist and he understands because the Lebanese belonging of those who say so is not
strong enough to feel what he is feeling and that these people have another belonging that may
be more important to them. But this is not the first time he uses the notion of nationalism and
belonging to make an argument.
Speaking in an interview23 on Mayadeen TV on April 29, 2018, Bassil said: “Isn’t it
enough that Lebanese prefer foreign interests to their own? Isn’t it enough for Lebanon that there
are people who are throwing out its identity this way? Every time it is this way. What state in the
world did the humanitarian deeds Lebanon did? We always see Lebanese people preferring the
Palestinian cause instead of the Lebanese cause, the Syrian cause instead of the Lebanese one.
The Gulf cause instead of the Lebanese cause. The American cause instead of the Lebanese.
Why is it that Lebanon always comes last? What international conspiracy is this that encourages
Syrians to stay in Lebanon when they can return?”

Political actors are divided regarding building official camps for refugees and those who
oppose the idea use the Palestinian refugees’ militarism as a priori to potential militarism of
Syrians if they are hosted in official settlements. Marwan Charbel’s tweet above says that he had
endorsed the ‘containment’ of Syrians in camps since the beginning of the crisis but this proposal
was declined in the parliament so that the crisis does not turn into the same as the Palestinians’
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situation. Another prominent political figure Naji Hayek, a member of Lebanon's Free Patriotic
Movement, said in a June 10, 2019 interview24 on Al-Jadeed/New TV (Lebanon): We have had a
very bad experience in Lebanon with the Palestinian refugees who came in 1848 and who started
just as the Syrians today. They changed in 25 years to a ‘gun for hire’, a gun that struck and
killed the Lebanese people and used to destroy the Lebanese people and the Lebanese state”.
“Those 1.5 million that came here in 2011, we opened our doors to them for humanitarian
reasons but it is not acceptable that 200,000 or 300,000 of them are military”. “Those who do not
want to return to regime held areas should go back and fight the regime and carry on their
mission not come stay with us ‘on our backs’ (meaning to exploit us) and say I am against the
regime. Those 1.5 million will begin to have weapons and once they do Lebanon will be
destroyed”
Religion is never absent when it comes to speaking against the presence of the refugees.
Christian Maronite President Michel Aoun said “the Christians of the east are not temporary on
this land and are not foreign congregations in it and cannot allow under any circumstances or
suffering to pull them out of it. They are its people...”

In the same manner Marwan Charbel confessed to Kalam Ennas that he asked the French
Minister to help Lebanon with the issue of the displaced Syrians and that this issue should be
discussed in Geneva 2.
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https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LbXJJjrE_XM

73

Speech acts by political figures are just words if they do not achieve their illocution.
Every interview given, every tweet and declaration urge the Lebanese citizens to look at the
refugees in a specific way. Politicians have managed to make the majority of their constituents
do their bidding without calling
overtly to be racist against
Syrian refugees. The graffiti25
originally read: “to every
despicable Syrian, leave” then
the word Syrian was crossed
and ‘racist’ was written in green
instead. The photo26 on the right
also shows the public’s reaction in a demonstration against Syrian refugees. In these protesters’
defense, Samy Gemayel, the President of the Lebanese Phalanges Party, said in a July 26, 2019
interview27 on Al-Hurra TV (U.S.): “It is only natural for people to say today, we don’t care how
or when or where but we want this problem solved and all states must bear the burden with us.
Our only fault as Lebanese is that we are bordering Syria...the Syrian crisis has nothing to do

25
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Graffitti from BBC article https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-26871736
Photo taken from Xinhuanet http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-11/29/c_138593483_4.htm
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with us, we did not cause it”, because according to
Bassil "Lebanon is the victim of a conspiracy ... for
settlement of the displaced Syrians in Lebanon, and
there is a media, financial and political system that is
working to encourage the displaced to stay and is
attacking us for our demand for the return of the
displaced," he stated over Twitter. He added,
"Someone who talks about the return of the displaced
is neither a racist nor a fascist, and those who accuse
us of racism are either benefitting or conspirators.
Just as Searle stated, speech acts succeed when the illocution act is achieved. The racist
political discourse prominent political figures of the Lebanese government started is now
translated in the citizen’s racist acts against the Syrian refugees. From local municipalities
recruiting their local citizens to restrict the refugees’ movements, to work lords paying refugees
less than minimum wage just because they cannot work legally, all prove that racism is achieved.
One of the goals set by UNHCR28 was to ensure that Syrian refugees are protected and are able
to obtain a legal temporary residency permit as well as registering newborns and protecting them
from forced repatriation. One of the most prominent campaigns29 initiated by the Lebanese
government to halt the recruitment of Syrian refugees and making Lebanese business owners pay
fines for hiring them. Lebanese business owners complained of not being able to find Lebanese
workers who would do the same kind of job for the same pay. Researcher Nasser Yassin said30
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https://www.unhcr.org/ar/4be7cc278c2.html
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30 https://cutt.ly/ZxpECDC
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that Syrian refugees are a burden on Lebanon with regards to the health and education sectors,
yet they do contribute effectively to its economy. In Arsal, a Lebanese town in the north, the
municipality force Syrian refugees to destroy their own concrete homes to be replaced with tents
so as to make sure that they do not find permanent residence in the country, according to Human
Rights Watch twitter account31. Amnesty International reported32 falsification of the Lebanese
government’s claims that Syrian refugees are voluntarily returning to Syria. In actual fact, the
government, according to Amnesty International, has been causing the refugees tremendous grief
that ultimately forces them to return to Syria. An example of which was the destruction of an
unofficial refugee camp in Darb Alahmar. Local villagers attacked the camp and set fire to some
َ - "حلوا عنا,
tents while threatening the refugees "ج َو ْيتوا لنا أرضنا – ع جهنم الحمرا إذا احترقتوا أو ال

translating to: “leave us- you trashed our land- to hell with you whether you burn or not.” Hours
after the incident, the same village along with neighboring ones released a statement calling for
the refugees to leave the area for ‘their protection’. Itihad Alshaab Alloubnani 33 is a Facebook
page dedicated for local updates and spread of many calls for movements against the refugees
and their naturalization. Such a page often calls refugees as ‘Dawaish’ translating to (of) ISIS or
saboteurs’ and some other times ‘informants.’
According to local newspaper ‘Alsafeer’, the municipality of Tartej belonging to Jbeil
forced Syrian refugees to dedicate a day of service to cleaning the town. In 2014, according to
ICPS34, the Lebanese government issued new laws to limit the number of refugees entering
Lebanon or staying in Lebanon. There were three principle goals to the new laws. The first was
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to prevent refugees from crossing the borders except for exceptional circumstances. The second
was to mandate the internal security forces and municipalities to regulate the entry of refugees.
The third, is to apply tighter control and application of laws over refuges to ‘protect’ the
Lebanese in the labor sector. The Minister of labor issued the jobs and positions to be filled by
Lebanese citizens only in an attempt to make it harder for Syrian refugees to fill any vacancy.
The dynamics among Lebanon’s elite political figures and coalitions influence Lebanon’s
politics with regards to the issue of refugees. Lebanon’s non-existent refugee regime and elitist
speech acts concerning the issue of Syrian refugees have become greatly securitized allowing
racism to take over. The refugees serve as a straw man to the many existing problems whether
economic, political, access to health and education or employment, the Lebanese government
failed to address. On social media, hashtags concerning the refugees reveal mixed sentiments
regarding their presence in Lebanon. Many activists are battling hate speech that causes racism
but as long as politicians use their popularity to spread hate, those activists will have a difficult
job convincing their fellow citizens otherwise.
When looking at the laws, tweets, slogans, etc. from a linguistic perspective, the common
denominator between all these forms is a securitizing language. In those that do not explicitly
call Syrian refugees a ‘threat’, the words used are mainly: illegal; saboteurs; informants;
protection of Lebanese; our/their; etc. the goal is to make sure that the image painted in for the
constituents is that they need ‘protection’. The reason given for the extreme measures that result
from the securitization process, the refugees end up racialized and discriminated against.
Securitizing refugees has worked toward the objective of deflecting social
malcontent for the broad range of development and governance issues Lebanese citizens face, as
well as the objective of securing much needed development funding from the international
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community. In this way, despite the rhetoric and policy that frames Syrian refugees as national
and social security threats, the securitization of this population is less about national or social
security but more about achieving broader political objectives. This securitization has ultimately
influenced the perceptions of the Lebanese public, increased tensions between the Lebanese
population and Syrian refugees, and has resulted in human rights abuses and protection gaps for
both groups.
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Chapter 5: Conclusion

By examining Lebanon under colonization and its long history post-colonization, we can
establish a better understanding of the continued influence of the colonial legacy France left
behind, not only on Lebanon but also on its relations with its neighbors. This colonial history that
created Lebanon’s borders still affects Lebanon’s politics. Colonialism created the current
Lebanese sectarian political system described as confessionalist and Lebanon’s nationalism in
order to establish a ‘balanced’ system of power on religious basis. Both the governmental system
and Lebanese nationalism are the legacy of France that still affects Lebanon’s political relations
with the rest of the Middle East. The colonial period of Lebanon began with the fall of the
Ottoman Empire by the end of the First World War. The French and British were able to divide
the region according to the 1916 Sykes-Picot agreement that put Lebanon under French rule
during the period of colonization and under its ‘informal’ trusteeship post-independence.
Lebanon became an independent state in 1943 but retained the political and social characteristics
that were defined by the French. Socially, Lebanon was put in a category of neither being Arab
nor fully Western. Politically, the official nationalism of Lebanon is the ideology that Lebanese
people are distinct with a common history, culture and values. This nationalism relies on the
social category to create a different identity, essentially white, that competes with the common
Arab nationalism as well as other types of nationalism especially the Syrian one inside Lebanon.
What is unique about Lebanese nationalism is its hybridity in meaning. It does not only entail
political ideology but also has a sentimental sense.
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The political ideology refers to the desire to identify the nation and practice sovereignty
over it to fulfill certain political and cultural desires on its behalf. The sentimental aspect refers
to the feelings of loyalty and relatedness to the nation and to one another among members that
belong to the nation. In this sense, Lebanese politicians found no issue in using both aspects in
the racialization of Syrian refugees to securitize their existence within the Lebanese nation and
deem it a threat. Even though the Lebanese nationalism that was established during the colonial
era was based on the argument that Lebanese descended from a Phoenician tribe that contributed
to the Western society has been disproved, the post-colonial nationalism drew from that
argument to create the modern form of nationalism and identity as being ideologically white.
In spite of the Lebanese government’s tedious efforts to contextualize Lebanon as a
distinct entity that has not ties to its surroundings, Lebanon became a ‘host’ since 2011 for
Syrian ‘newcomers’. The actual practice of hospitality was extended due to family ties at times
and the necessity to deal with a local crisis so that they could reclaim their home and maintain
order. The humanitarian dimension was given to the notion of hospitality to avoid the tension
(Carpi and Şenoğuz, 2018, 127). Defining Lebanon as host gives it power to exacerbate human
capital exploitation, creating the divide among classes and friction on the borders. This tension
between the social groups is the doing of the host country that promotes its own nationalism and
stereotypes. Lebanese politicians used this tension to restore the country’s power as the host, as
the discourse of generosity and rights allow the host state to gain a better grip on the social fiber
and eliminate any ‘threats’ to the people and the resources. There is the worthy and unworthy
among the refugees in relation to the economic status of the receiving state. If the businesses by
the refugees had a good relationship with the host state, those refugees could be labeled worthy.
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If they are deemed so, this would be thanks to the morality of the community. In the same logic,
those refugees who are seen as a burden are seen as political and as economic threats.
The hospitality narrative in the shape of a humanitarian toolkit leaves a large number of
refugees out of both the humanitarian and political agenda. In light of this, the hospitality
discourse leads to sanctioning those unworthy of help because they do not possess the assets or
the capacity and social status they need to deserve to be noted as welcomed guests. The
unconditional hospitality was justified because of the close ties and unresolved border between
the countries. But this unconditional hospitality was only for a time. When the number of Syrians
continued to increase, Lebanon started to face a crisis. Over a million refugees were registered
making a quarter of the population in Lebanon Syrian. Initially, refugees were depicted as
vulnerable in the media but this representation quickly changed to become called ‘refugee crisis’.
Lebanese politicians refer to the refugees as ‘displaced’ which allows them to politicize their
presences and mark them as aliens belonging to a different place. Refugeehood, on the other
hand, entails certain humanitarian rights that Lebanon does not adhere by because to the
government, Syrian refugees are not refugees to them.
Lebanon has fallen into the type of ‘nation’ that existed in the nineteenth century when
this concept was built on requirements like that people living within the borders of this nation
have to be similar to each other in every way: looks, culture, socio-economic background, etc.
This way, society would be cohesive and these similar attributes would contribute to the ‘us and
‘them’ notion. With this in mind, the Lebanese government politicized the issue of the refugees
and worked on securitizing them to be racialized and deemed as threats that need to be
eliminated. Through carefully structured speech acts, refugees were associated with the same
danger they fled their country because of, terrorism. Not only are they framed as threats to
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Lebanon’s peace and security but also as dangerous to the cohesion of the society that Lebanese
people think they created themselves.
In its approach towards the Syrian refugees, Lebanon is wearing a white mask that is
affecting its policies within its borders as well as its foreign policy. Due to the lengthy
colonization period of this country and the continued white French influence on at least the
Maronites who hold the presidency in Lebanon, Syrians would never be seen as belonging or
deserving to belong in Lebanon even for humanitarian reasons. To Lebanon, Syrian refugees are
different in every aspect and do not fit in the Lebanese national or international scene. The image
of the Syrian person changed from the despised soldier that was physically present fifteen years
ago to the now unwanted terrorist, thief, and even rapist, etc. Racializing refugees strips them
from their basic rights of a good life and security and makes them targets for discrimination and
inhuman treatment.
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